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THE CAUSATION FALLACY:
BAKKE AND THE BASIC ARITHMETIC
OF SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS
Goodwin Liu*
Last Term, the Supreme Court turned down two invitations to re
solve the constitutionality of affirmative action in college and univer
sity admissions. In May 2001, the Court for the second time declined
to review a Fifth Circuit decision holding that the use of racial prefer
ences to achieve diversity in the student body serves no compelling in
terest.1 A few weeks later, the Court let stand a conflicting Ninth
Circuit decision that upheld a .law school affirmative action policy on
the ground that "educational diversity is a compelling governmental
interest that meets the demands of strict scrutiny."2 The legal contro
versy over admissions preferences intensified in August 2001 when the
Eleventh Circuit invalidated the University of Georgia's undergradu
ate affirmative action policy on the ground that it was not narrowly
tailored.3 With the Sixth Circuit's recent decision upholding the
University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action policy4 and yet
another ruling expected soon,5 the debate will soon come to a full boil.
Facing an array of divergent lower court opinions on the issue, the
Supreme Court may well decide in the next few months that the time
for a final resolution has come.
Although the most recent legal challenges to racial preferences in
university admissions vary in their details, they are unified by a com
mon narrative - the same narrative that animated Allan Bakke's law* O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, Washington, D.C. B.S. 1991, Stanford; B.A. 1993, Oxford;
J.D. 1998, Yale. - Ed. I am grateful to Brianne Ford for research assistance a nd to Robert
Gordon, Linda Lye, Nathaniel Persily, David Tatel, and Ann O'Leary for thoughtful com
me nts on earlier drafts and for e ncouragement and support during my writing process.
1. See Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
2550 (2001); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033
(1996); see also Lutheran Church-Mo. Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(suggesting in dicta that diversity may never constitute a compelling interest).
2. Smith v. U niv. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1 188, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
121 S. Ct. 2192 (2001); see id. at 1200 n.9 (acknowledging Hopwood as "contrary" authority,
but rejecting it as "flaw[ed]").
3. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1254 (11th Cir. 2001).
4. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002).
5. Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (upholding affirmative ac
tion in U niversity of Michigan undergraduate admissions policy), appeal docketed, Nos. 011333, 01-1416, 01-1418 (6th Cir. Mar. 27, 2001).
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suit against the Davis Medical School over twenty years ago.6 Bakke
won admission to the medical school after convincing the Supreme
Court that the school's practice of setting aside sixteen out of 100 seats
in each incoming class for minority students was an unconstitutional
racial quota. The record shows that Bakke was, in fact, a highly quali
fied applicant. His undergraduate grades and standardized test scores
were excellent, far better than the averages for minority students ad
mitted through the set-aside. Yet the medical school rejected Bakke's
application, even as it admitted minority applicants in numbers large
enough to fill the sixteen-seat quota. This prompted Bakke to com
plain that affirmative action cost him a letter of admission, and the
success of his lawsuit confirms what so many people find unfair about
affirmative action: By according substantial preferences to minority
applicants, affirmative action causes the displacement of deserving
white applicants like Allan Bakke and the plaintiffs now following in
his footsteps.7
This Article argues that the perceived unfairness is more exagger
ated than real. The perception is a distortion of statistical truth, prem
ised on an error in logic. There is strong evidence, as Bakke 's story
suggests, that minority applicants stand a much better chance of gain
ing admission to selective institutions with the existence of affirmative
action. But that fact provides no logical basis to infer that white appli
cants would stand a much better chance of admission in the absence of
affirmative action. To draw such an inference, as opponents of af
firmative action routinely do, is to indulge what I call "the causation
fallacy" - the common yet mistaken notion that when white appli
cants like Allan Bakke fail to gain admission ahead of minority appli
cants with equal or lesser qualifications, the likely cause is affirmative
action.
The causation fallacy reflects white anxiety over the intensely
competitive nature of selective admissions,8 and it undoubtedly ac6. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
7. Although I use the term "minority" to label applicants who benefit from affirmative
action and the term "white" to label those who do not, I recognize that some minority appli
cants do not benefit from affirmative action a nd that some affirmative action programs may
benefit disadvantaged whites. Given this reality, it is probably more precise to use the ge
neric terms "preferred" and " nonpreferred" applicants. But I stick to the terms "minority"
and "white" in order to track the usage in common discourse on affirmative action. As
Bakke's claim demonstrates, that discourse typically characterizes affirmative action as pit
ting minority applicants against white applicants in a deep racial conflict. This Article is a n
attempt to explain a nd dispel that characterization.
8. The intense competition among selective institutions for academically talented stu
dents is a relatively recent phenomenon in American higher education, largely driven by
economic, social, legal, and demographic forces that have conspired over the last century to
make educational opportunity more desirable and more attainable for an expanding major
ity of the citizenry. See generally NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MERITOCRACY (1999). U ntil the mid-1900s, elite colleges such
as Harvard, Yale, a nd Princeton "educated the solid, if less industrious, members of
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counts for much of the moral outrage that affirmative action inspires
among unsuccessful white applicants. It was widely reported, for ex
ample, that what prompted Jennifer Gratz to become the lead plaintiff
in a major test case challenging the University of Michigan's use of ra
cial preferences in undergraduate admissions was her overriding sense
that she had been displaced by less qualified minority applicants.9 Ob
servers of politics will recall a 1990 television commercial that de
picted the plight of applicants like Bakke and Gratz by showing a pair
of white hands crumpling a letter informing the recipient he had lost a
job to a minority applicant. "You needed that job," the voice-over
said. "And you were the best qualified. But they had to give it to a mi
nority because of a racial quota. Is that really fair?"10 Michael Lind, an
otherwise thoughtful commentator on the subject, has said that "[i]n
order to accommodate a few less-qualified black students, the Univer
sity of Texas Law School, like other leading law schools, must tum
down hundreds or thousands of academically superior white students
America's upper-middle and upper classes, [then] almost exclusively WASP . . . . Academic
requirements were modest; students of good character who could pay the tuition were usu
ally admitted." MARCIA GRAHAM SYNNOTI, THE HALF-OPENED DOOR: DISCRIMINATION
AND ADMISSIONS AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON, 1900-1970, at 4 (1979). At
Princeton, for example, " [i]n 1958, about 70 percent of alumni son applications were ac
cepted for the class of 1962, as against only 35 percent of those without Princeton connec
tions." Id. at 221.
An alumni son was not required "to compete against non-Princeton sons," but was admitted
if his "character record [was] satisfactory " and if the committee could answer just one major
question in the affirmative: "Can he be expected to graduate?" The fruits of such preference
were seen in the freshman class admitted in 1957: "50% of the bottom quarter, academically
speaking, was made up of Princeton sons. "
Id. ; see also id. at 206 (" [A]lumni sons, who were, on the whole, economically and socially
upper-middle-class and 'scholastically average' . . . made up about 20 percent of [Harvard's]
class of 1951.").
It is perhaps unremarkable that criticism of affirmative action has intensified as elite
schools have become more selective. See, e.g. , Stanley Rothman & Amy E. Black, Who
Rules Now? American Elites in the 1990s, SOC'Y, Sept. 1, 1998, at 17 (reporting survey result
that " while in 1980, very few whites (less than one in twenty) expressed the view that minor
ity gains came at the expense of whites, almost half our white respondents support that view
now"). What is remarkable, however, is evidence that even with affirmative action, the aver
age SAT score of black matriculants at selective schools in 1989 was higher than the average
for all matriculants at such schools in 1951. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE
SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE
AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 30 (1998). Such data put the current affirmative action de
bate into proper historical perspective. See id. (" The alumni/ae of the 1950s should have no
reason to question the qualifications of the black students of today!").

9. Ethan Bronner, Group Suing U. of Michigan Over Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
1997, at A24 ("I knew of people accepted to Ann Arbor who were less qualified, and my
first reaction when I was rejected was, 'Let's sue,' . . . . ) (quoting Jennifer Gratz); Jodi S.
Cohen, Affirmative Action on Trial; Denial Shatters Dream; Southgate Woman Key Figure in
University Bias Suit, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 12, 2000, at Al (profile of Jennifer Gratz); see
also Kenneth J. Cooper, Deciding Who Gets In and Who Doesn't; Schools Consider Many
Factors, From Grade A verage to 'Get Up and Go', WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2000, at AS.
"

10. Peter Applebome, Subtly and Not, Race Bubbles Up as Issue in North Carolina
Contest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1990, at Al (quoting television commercial).
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every year."11 And a recent national survey confirms that affirmative
action remains highly unpopular among whites in part because of per
ceptions of increased competition with minorities for employment and
educational opportunities.12
Yet the powerful appeal of the causation fallacy is all the more
reason for courts and commentators to purge it from moral and legal
discourse on affirmative action, especially as the current spate of anti
affirmative action lawsuits percolates up to the Supreme Court. At its
core, the fallacy erroneously conflates the magnitude of affirmative ac
tion's instrumental benefit to minority applicants, which is large, with
the magnitude of its instrumental cost to white applicants, which is
small. While not the first to observe the arithmetic error at the root of
the fallacy,13 this Article is the first to give the error a name, to expose
the genesis of this error in Bakke, and to examine its implications for
the standing of white plaintiffs and the merits of their claims. What
this Article demonstrates is that the causation fallacy, by unduly mag
nifying the practical harm suffered by white applicants, stands in the
way of any rational effort to evaluate the fairness of affirmative action.
At the outset, I wish to make clear what this Article does not do. It
does not definitively resolve the constitutionality of affirmative action,
nor does it prove the ultimate fairness or worthiness of affirmative ac·

1 1 . MICHAEL LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN NATION 166 (1995) (citing Lino Graglia,
Racial Preferences in Admission to Institutions of Higher Education, in THE IMPERILED
ACADEMY 134 (Howard Dickman ed., 1993)). The careful reader will note that Lind's asser
tion flatly defies basic arithmetic.
12. See Richard Morin, Misperceptions Cloud Whites' View of Blacks, WASH. POST, July
1 1 , 2001, at Al. This Article does not address affirmative action in the employment context.
Instead, it focuses exclusively on the use of racial preferences in the admissions processes of
selective colleges and universities. Although the Article's main statistical argument is appli
cable to most educational contexts where race is a factor in selective admissions, its applica
bility is more variable in the context of employment. The reason is that the relative magni
tudes of the pertinent statistical parameters (e.g., spaces available, number of minority
applicants, number of total applicants) are not as consistent across employment opportuni
ties as they are across educational opportunities where race is a factor in selection. See infra
note 76 (discussing evidence that race is a significant factor in admissions only at the most
selective schools) .
13. See, e.g., Thomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College Admissions, in
TEST SCORE G AP 453-54 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds.,
1998); Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and
the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HAR V. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381 , 422-23 n.192 (1998); Andrew
Hacker, The Myths of Racial Division, GUARDIAN, May 1, 1992, at 19 (analyzing ANDREW
HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992))
("(I]n the end black Americans remain a relatively small minority, so there are limits to how
many whites they can displace even with aggressive affirmative action recruiting."); John
Iwasaki, A ffirmative Action Aids White Students Too; Stereotype False, State Study Says,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 19, 1995, at A9 ("(M]any white students who were
denied admission did not lose out because of minority students, but because of tight limits on
enrollment. In other words, many qualified white applicants probably would have been
turned down even if no minority students had applied."); Gary Orfield, Boston Needs to
Strengthen its Case for Diversity at Latin School, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 1 1 , 1999, at A15
("[W]hites tend to overestimate what they actually 'lose' through affirmative action . . . . ).
THE BLACK-WHITE
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tion as a matter of social policy. Grand ambitions of this sort are diffi
cult to accomplish given the strength of the arguments and the depth
of feelings on both sides of the debate. At the same· time, I do not
claim immunity from the pressure to be either "for" or "against" af
firmative action;14 indeed, I have made no mystery of where my sym
pathies lie.15 But this Article, by design, has a limited scope. I have
chosen to focus on a specific strand of argument made by white appli
cants who oppose racial preferences in an attempt to loosen the grip
that argument has had on the affirmative action debate. My effort be
gins with a showing that Bakke, as a story about how affirmative ac
tion affects white applicants, is wrong both on its own facts and as a
broadly representative narrative. That showing, which exposes the
causation fallacy, does not conclusively resolve whether affirmative
action is fair or unfair to white applicants. But it does enable us to en
gage that question in more lucid, more rigorous, and less polarizing
terms.
This Article has four parts. Parts I and II demonstrate that the cau
sation fallacy defies the basic arithmetic of selective admissions. My
argument proceeds from one simple statistical truth: In any admissions
process where applicants greatly outnumber admittees, and where
white applicants greatly outnumber minority applicants, substantial
preferences for minority applicants will not significantly diminish the
odds of admission facing white applicants. Part I develops this argu
ment by showing that the racial quota in Bakke, though a substantial
benefit to minority applicants, was not likely the sole or even the pri
mary reason for Bakke's rejection. His success in winning an order of
admission from the Supreme Court, it turns out, was attributable not
to the likelihood of his admission had there been no racial quota, but
to a little-known procedural quirk barely acknowledged in Justice
Powell's opinion and rarely if ever mentioned in commentary. Part II
corroborates this analysis of Bakke with similar findings based on un
dergraduate admissions data from William Bowen and Derek Bok's
comprehensive study of affirmative action, The Shape of the River.16
These findings and the logic behind them show that the admission of
minority applicants and the rejection of white applicants are largely
independent events, improperly linked through the causation fallacy.
Parts III and IV examine the legal implications of dispelling the
causation fallacy. Part III begins with the recognition that, absent the
causation fallacy, white applicants have legitimate grounds for claim14. See Anthony T. Kronrnan, ls Diversity a Value in American Higher Education?, 52
FLA. L. REV. 861, 862 (2000) (noting the difficulty of "sustain[ing] an intermediate position
that is sympathetic and skeptical at once" in light of "the pressure to be 'for' or 'against' af
firmative action without reservation").·
15. See Liu, supra note 13.
16.

BOWEN & BOK,

supra note 8.
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ing that affirmative action prevents them from competing on an equal
footing with minority applicants. Such a claim, which is distinct from a
claim of displacement, establishes a cognizable equal protection in
jury. Importantly, however, not all white applicants are positioned to
raise an equal-footing claim. When the mechanics of selective admis
sions are analyzed at the level of individual applicants, it becomes
clear that a substantial number of unsuccessful white applicants
(somewhere close to half in Bowen and Bok's study) are too weak to
be admitted even when placed on an equal footing with minority ap
plicants. Because the failure of those applicants to gain admission has
nothing to do with race, they lack standing to challenge affirmative ac
tion. Among the remaining white applicants, all have standing to raise
an equal-footing claim, but under current law, most are not entitled to
sue for damages or other retrospective relief. Only the tiniest fraction
of unsuccessful white applicants genuinely conforms to the Bakke nar
rative, and there is reason to believe that such highly qualified appli
cants make unlikely plaintiffs.
Finally, Part IV discusses the implications of the causation fallacy
for evaluating the constitutional merits of affirmative action. Because
strict scrutiny takes into account the nature and severity of the burden
that affirmative action imposes on white applicants, it is essential to
characterize that burden accurately, without the distorting influence of
the causation fallacy. Moreover, exposing the causation fallacy has the
salutary effect of centering the merits inquiry on whether white appli
cants are improperly stereotyped, not displaced, by affirmative action.
Claims of displacement tend to inflate the degree of racial conflict in
herent in race-conscious admissions, thereby heightening the pressure
to be "for" or "against" affirmative action. In contrast, the stereotyp
ing concern defuses the tendency toward polarization by relating the
fairness of affirmative action to the concrete workings of particular
policies.
I.

BAKKE REVISITED

Let us begin with a familiar story. In 1973, a white student named
Allan Bakke applied unsuccessfully for admission to the Davis
Medical School at the University of California. Bakke reapplied in
1974 and was again turned down. At the time, the medical school en
rolled 100 new students each year and operated a two-track admis
sions process consisting of a general admissions program, under which
Bakke's application was reviewed, and a special admissions program,
under which various minority applicants could seek review.17 The spe17. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 274-76 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
J.). The medical school's formal policy indicated that any applicant who identified herself or
himself as "economically and/or educationally disadvantaged" could seek review under the
special admissions program. Id. at 272 n.l. In fact, large numbers of disadvantaged whites
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cial program screened minority applicants to fill a quota; it continually
recommended applicants to the general admissions committee until
sixteen were admitted.18 Before the Supreme Court, Bakke argued
that the "racial quota . . . prevented [him] from competing for 16 of
the 100 places at the Davis Medical School and, as a result, barred him
- by reason of race alone - from attending the school."19
Justice Powell agreed. As a preface to Bakke's legal claims, Justice
Powell observed that " [i]n both years, applicants were admitted under
the special program with grade point averages, [Medical College Ad
mission Test] scores, and bench mark scores significantly lower than
Bakke's."20 To make this clear, he dropped a footnote showing the
following table:21

Science
GPA

CLASS ENTERING IN 1974
Verbal
Quant.
MCAT
MCAT
Overall
GPA
{%ile}
{%ile}

Science
MCAT

{%ile}

Bakke

3.44

3.46

96

94

97

Regular
admittees

3.36

3.29

69

67

82

Special
admittees

2.42

2.62

34

30

37

After finding the quota unconstitutional, Justice Powell affirmed
the California Supreme Court's judgment ordering Bakke's admis
sion.22 The medical school had chosen not to contest Bakke's admissi
bility absent the quota,23 and Justice Powell noted that "[h]ere . . .
there is no question as to the sole reason for respondent's rejection purposeful racial discrimination in the form of the special admissions
applied to the special program. Id. at 275 n.5. No whites, however, were ever admitted
through the special program. Id. at 276 & n.6.
18. Competition within the special program was substantial. Even discounting the dis
advantaged white applicants in the pool, the special program admitted only 7 .1 % of minority
applicants (sixteen out of 224) in 1973 and only 3.5% of minority applicants (sixteen out of
456) in 1974. Id. at 275 n.5.
19. Brief for Respondent at 63, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(No. 76-811).
20. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277.
21. See id. at 277 n.7. Allan Bakke also applied unsuccessfully in 1973 , and the footnote
includes a second table showing similar data for the class entering in 1973. The two tables in
footnote 7 include a sixth column titled "Gen. Infor." I have omitted it because Justice
Powell nowhere explains or relies on the data in this column.
22. Id. at 320.
23. Id.
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program."24 In other words, affirmative action cost Bakke his seat at
the Davis Medical School.
What, if anything, is wrong with this story?
A. An Introduction to the Causation Fallacy
However neat and intelligible, the conventional rendition of Bakke
defies common sense. The reason is clear upon a closer look at the ta
ble in Justice Powell's footnote. That table unambiguously shows that
Bakke's academic qualifications were far better than those of the av
erage special admittee. His MCAT scores placed him roughly in the
top 5 % of test-takers, whereas the average scores of the special admit
tees placed them in the bottom third.25 Likewise, his science grade
point average was more than one full point (one letter grade) higher
than the average of the special admittees.26 These large gaps strongly
suggest that the special program afforded minority applicants a sub. stantial preference in admissions.27
However, although Justice Powell notes these "significant[ ]" dis
parities,28.he fails to point out what I find to be the most striking in
formation in the table: Bakke's grade point averages and MCAT
scores in 1974 were not only far better than those of the special admit
tees, but also significantly better than those of the regular admittees.
Indeed, Bakke's academic indicators were high by any measure and,
importantly, higher than those of the majority of applicants who
gained admission under the regular program.29
How did these applicants get in ahead of Bakke? Clearly, the
medical school admitted students not only on the basis of grades and
test scores, but also on the basis of other factors relevant to the study
and practice of medicine - effective communication skills, demon
strated compassion, commitment to a particular field of research, and
perhaps others. From Justice Powell's opinion, we do not learn exactly
what qualities the regular admittees had that Bakke lacked, although
Justice Powell noted that the chairman of the admissions committee,
who interviewed Bakke in 1974, "found Bakke 'rather limited in his
approach' to the problems of the medical profession and found dis
turbing Bakke's 'very definite opinions which were based more on his
24. Id. at 321 n.54.
25. See id. at 277 n.7.
26. Id.
27. But cf infra text accompanying notes 83-86 (discussing why the use of averages to
infer the magnitude of preference accorded to minority applicants is not entirely valid).
28. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277.
29. Id. at 277 n.7. Although the grade point averages and test scores of regular admittees
in footnote 7 are means, not medians, I think it is reasonable to assume that the admittees
are normally distributed around each mean.
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personal viewpoints than upon a study of the total problem.' "30 The
point is that many reasons, apart from racial preferences, might ex
plain Bakke's failure to achieve a more competitive position relative
to the fifty or more regular admittees with grades and test scores lower
than his.31
To be sure, the sixteen-seat set-aside lowered Bakke's chance of
admission. But by how much? One rudimentary way to think about
this question is to compare (a) Bakke's likelihood of admission as an
applicant for only the eighty-four seats available through the regular
admissions program with (b) his likelihood of admission had he been
able to compete for all 100 seats in the entering class. To simplify the
comparison, let us assume that none of the special applicants would
have been admitted ahead of any of the regular applicants.32 In 1974,
Bakke was one of 3109 regular applicants to the Davis Medical
School.33 With the racial quota, the average likelihood of admission
among regular applicants was 2.7% (eighty-four seats divided by 3 109
applicants). With no racial quota, the average likelihood of admission
would have been 3.2% (100 seats divided by 3109 applicants).34 In
30. Id. at 277 (quoting the record).
31. Neither Justice Powell's opinion nor the litigation record indicates exactly how many
regular admittees had grades and test scores lower than Bakke's. Using the number of regu
lar admittees who matriculated (eighty-four) as a lower bound for the number of regular ap
plicants who were admitted, and assuming that the grade point averages and test scores of
regular admittees are normally distributed around the mean, I estimate that fifty or sixty
regular admittees, at a minimum, had grades and test scores lower than Bakke's. The true
number is certainly much higher, because not all admittees choose to matriculate. But I am
unable to estimate the true number reliably without knowing either the total number of ap
plicants admitted under the regular program or the percentage of admittees who decided to
matriculate.
32. This assumption is improbable despite the large gaps in average GPAs and MCAT
scores between special and regular admittees. Special applicants at the high end of their dis
tribution likely had GPAs and test scores at least as high as, if not higher than, those of
regular applicants at the low end of their distribution. Indeed, the record shows that,
whereas Bakke had an overall GPA of 3.46 and a science GPA of 3.44, Bakke, 438 U.S. at
277 n.7, the overall GPA of special admittees ranged up to 3.76 in 1973 and up to 3.45 in
1974, and the science GPA of special admittees ranged up to 3.89 in 1974, see Brief of Amici
Curiae National Urban League et al. at 12 n.6, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, No. 76-811
(U.S. filed Jan. 14, 1977) (on petition for writ of certiorari) (hereinafter Amici National
Urban League). The assumption that none of the special applicants would have been admit
ted under the regular program thus establishes an upper bound for the cost of affirmative
action to regular applicants like Bakke.
33. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 273 n.2 (noting that 3737 applications were submitted for the
1974 entering class); id. at 275 n.S (noting that 628 persons applied to the special committee
in 1974). 3737 - 628 3,109.
=

34. I describe this comparison as rudimentary because it does not account for the fact
that the medical school had to admit more than 84 or 100 applicants in order to obtain a
"yield" of 84 or 100 matriculants. In other words, the average admission rates for white ap
plicants - i.e., the likelihood of receiving a letter of admission - were higher than my
rough calculations show, both with and without the quota. But without knowing the total
number of admittees or the yield rates for the medical school, see supra note 31, I am unable
to offer a more precise calculation. Part II of this Article, which examines undergraduate
admissions data, provides a much more refined iteration of this method of statistical com-

Michigan Law Review

1054

[Vol. 1 00:1045

other words, the quota increased the average likelihood of rejection
among regular applicants from 96.8% to 97.3%.
Admittedly, this comparison is somewhat artificial because Bakke
was clearly not an average applicant. However weak his interview may
have been, his test scores and grade point averages gave him a sub
stantial edge over the majority of regular applicants. We do not know
exactly how much the admissions committee had narrowed the regular
applicant pool before rejecting Bakke, but we do know that Bakke re
ceived an interview and that, under the regular admissions program,
"[a]bout one out of six applicants was invited for a personal inter
view."35 Thus, Bakke was one of roughly 520 regular applicants inter
viewed (3109 divided by six). Among these highly qualified applicants,
the average rate of admission with the racial quota in place was 16.2%
(eighty-four seats divided by 520 applicants). Without the quota, the
average rate of admission would have been 19.2% (100 seats divided
by 520 applicants).
Of course, with additional criteria, it may be possible to narrow
down Bakke's competition to a small enough number that the effect of
the quota turns out to be substantial. The point, however, is that with
out precise information about how Bakke's application fared in the
overall pool - and Justice Powell's opinion provides none - no rea
sonable basis exists to infer that the racial quota, and not some other
selection criterion, caused his application to be rejected. In a selection
process where there are far more applicants than available opportuni
ties, the likelihood of success for any candidate is low, even under
race-neutral criteria. Reserving a small number of seats for minority
applicants, relative to the total number of seats, will not decrease that
low likelihood very much. Based on the data in Justice Powell's opin
ion, the most reasonable inference is that affirmative action did not
appreciably affect Bakke's chance of admission.
B.

Discrimination Based on Race?

Apart from its small size, the special admissions program had an
other feature that, while not typical of affirmative action policies in
general, underscores the illogic of the causal narrative in Bakke. Al
though we have come to understand Davis's special program as a
paradigmatic racial quota, the fact is that the program was officially
designed to accord admissions preferences not on the basis of race, but
on the basis of economic or educational disadvantage.36 In the trial
court, the chairman of the admissions committee described the special
parison, including adjustments for yield. See infra Part II.
35. Id. at 273-74.
36. Id. at 274-75 & n.4.
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program as an effort to " 'give[] preference to applicants from disad
vantaged backgrounds, [using] minority group status as one factor in
determining relative disadvantage,' "37 and Justice Powell's opinion
notes that seventy-three of the 297 special applicants in 1973 were
white, and that 172 of the 628 special applicants in 1974 were white.38
Yet no white student was ever admitted through the special program39
- a fact that prompted the trial court to opine, correctly in my view,
that "a white student who had applied for the special program and
been refused purely on the basis of his race would have been in a
much stronger position to question this practice than the plaintiff."40
Bakke, the trial court found, "did not apply to [the] special program as
a disadvantaged student,"41 and he never claimed in his lawsuit that he
qualified as disadvantaged.
It is thus doubly surprising that Bakke succeeded in attributing his
failure to gain admission to racial discrimination. Not only is there no
sound basis for inferring that the sixteen-seat set-aside caused Bakke's
rejection, there is also no basis for believing that Bakke was excluded
from the special program based on his race as opposed to his lack of
disadvantage. Justice Powell, finding it was not "fatal to Bakke's
standing that he was not a 'disadvantaged' applicant,'' determined that
"[ d]espite the program's purported emphasis on disadvantage, it was a
minority enrollment program with a secondary disadvantage ele
ment. "42 But disadvantaged white applicants were allowed to apply
and did apply to the special program, and "[a]pplicants from mi
norit[y] [groups] but non-disadvantaged backgrounds [were] referred
to the regular admissions process. "43 Had Bakke claimed disadvantage
and applied to the special program, he would have had a legitimate
claim of race discrimination. Yet on the facts of his case, Bakke's
claim of race discrimination seems inapposite. Being nonwhite by it
self would not have qualified him for special consideration, and Bakke
adduced no facts indicating that he was economically or educationally
disadvantaged. In short, Bakke's exclusion from the special program
37. Notice of Intended Decision at 87a, Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (Cal. Super.
Ct. Nov. 25, 1974) (No. 31287) (on file with author) (quoting Dr. George H. Lowrey) [here
inafter Intended Decision]. The Intended Decision is reproduced in the appendix to the uni
versity's petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, No. 76-811 (U.S. filed Dec. 14, 1976) (on file with author). The page citations refer to
that appendix.
38. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275 n.5.
39. Id. at 276.
40. Intended Decision, supra note 37, at 94a.
41. Id.
42. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281 n.14 (opinion of Powell, J.).
43. Intended Decision, supra note 37, at 88a. In fact, as Justice Powell acknowledged,
fifteen minority applicants were admitted through the regular program in 1973, and nine
were admitted through the regula r program in 1974. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276 n.6.
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was no more a consequence of racial discrimination than it was a con
sequence of discrimination on the basis of disadvantage.
C.

The Real Story ofAllan Bakke's Admission to the
Davis Medical School

Assuming that Bakke stated a valid claim of race discrimination, it
remains difficult to see how Justice Powell could have concluded that
there was "no question" that the sixteen-seat set-aside was the "sole
reason" for Bakke's rejection.44 As shown above, the sheer numerical
parameters of the admissions process and the relevance of selection
criteria other than grades and test scores do not support that conclu
sion. It must be remembered, however, that Justice Powell reached his
conclusion only after observing that the medical school "ha[d] con
ceded that it could not carry its burden of proving that, but for the ex
istence of its unlawful special admissions program, [Bakke] still would
not have been admitted. "45 This raises an important question: If the
statistical analysis above is at all compelling, then why did the univer
sity concede the issue of Bakke's likelihood of admission absent af
firmative action? Did the reservation of sixteen seats actually affect
Bakke's odds of admission to a much greater extent than my statistical
argument suggests? The answer, it turns out, makes for an interesting
tale about the university's litigation strategy but does nothing to shore
up the fallacy in Bakke's causal argument.
In his original complaint in state court, Bakke sought an injunction
"directing defendants to admit plaintiff to said Medical School."46 The
university's answer asserted unequivocally: "Petitioner was not denied
admission to the Davis Medical School as a result of the operation of
the special admissions program at said school. Petitioner would not
have been admitted to said school even if there had been no such spe
cial admissions program."47 After a bench trial, the state court con
cluded that the special admissions program was unconstitutional but
declined to order Bakke's admission.48 The trial court's findings of fact
state that in both 1973 and 1974 "[p]laintiff would not have been ac
cepted for admission . . . even if there had been no special admissions
44. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 n.54.
45. Id. at 320.
46. Complaint at 4, Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (Cal. Super. Ct. June 20, 1974)
(No. 31287) (on file with author).
47. First Amended Answer at 7, Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug.
1, 1974) (No. 31287) (on file with author).
48. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 117a, Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal. (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 1975) (No. 31287) (on file with author). The Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law are reproduced in the appendix to the university's petition for cer
tiorari, and the page numbers refer to that appendix.
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program."49 In support of this finding, the court noted that Bakke "was
not put on the alternate list" in 1973 or 1974, that "few of those on the
alternate list were accepted" in either year, and that in 1 974 thirty-two
applicants with ratings higher than Bakke's, including twenty on the
alternate list, had not been admitted.so Moreover, the chairman of the
admissions committee, Dr. George Lowrey, had testified that "Mr.
Bakke would not have been admitted in either year even if there had
been no special admissions program."s1
On appeal, the California Supreme Court agreed that the special
admissions program was unconstitutional.s2 The court additionally
held, however, that the trial court should have assigned the university,
not Bakke, the burden of proof on the issue whether Bakke would
have been admitted absent the special program.s3 Facing a remand on
that issue,s4 the university filed a petition for rehearing in which it
stipulated that it would not attempt to meet its burden of proof.ss
While stating - contrary to its earlier position and contrary to the
trial court's findings - that "Mr. Bakke was a highly qualified appli
cant and came extremely close to admission in 1 973 even with the spe
cial admissions program being in operation,"s6 the university went on
to offer the following explanation for its stipulation:
Further, in the event [the California Supreme Court] adheres to its deci
sion on the constitutional issue, the University has a strong interest in ob
taining review by the United States Supreme Court of the question of
whether the special admissions program at the Davis Medical School and
other similar programs are . . . unconstitutional. It is far more important
for the University to obtain the most authoritative decision possible on the
legality of its admissions process than to argue over whether Mr. Bakke
would or would not have been admitted in the absence of the special ad
missions program. A remand to the trial court for determination of that
factual issue might delay and perhaps prevent review of the constitutional

issue by the United States Supreme Court.s7
49. Id. at 116a-117a.
50. Id. at 116a.

51. Intended Decision, supra note 37, at 108a (quoting Dr. Lowrey).
52. Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152, 1172 (Cal. 1976).
53. Id.
54. In its original disposition of the case, the California Supreme Court said: "[W]e re
mand the case to the trial court for the purpose of determining, under the proper allocation
of the burden of proof, whether Bakke would have been admitted to the 1973 or 1974 en
tering class absent the special admission program." Compare Bakke, 553 P.2d at 1172, with
Modification of Opinion at 80a, Bakke, 553 P.2d 1152 (S.F. 23311) (Cal. Oct. 28, 1976). The
Modification of Opinion is reproduced in the appendix to the university's petition for certio
rari, and the page number refers to that appendix.
55. Petition for Rehearing at 11, Bakke, 553 P.2d 1152 (S.F. 23311) (Cal. Sept. 30, 1976).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added).
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The California Supreme Court accepted the stipulation and, instead of
remanding the case to the trial court, amended its disposition of the
case to state that Bakke "is entitled to an order that he be admitted to
the University. "58
The record of litigation thus shows that the university's concession
was a last-minute switch on the eve of seeking certiorari. Eager for a
definitive resolution of the constitutional issue, the university candidly
acknowledged that proof of Bakke's inadmissibility might cast doubt
on his standing and, in turn, the Supreme Court's Article III jurisdic
tion.59 Indeed, when the university filed its petition for certiorari, a
coalition of fifteen civil rights groups, bar associations, and unions
submitted an amicus brief opposing certiorari on the ground that the
university's stipulation was "an [e]ffort to [f]abricate [j]urisdiction" in
the Supreme Court.ro As that brief makes clear, ample facts were
available to the university to show that Bakke would have been denied
admission in 1973 and 1974 even if all sixteen seats in the special pro
gram had been available. In 1973, at the time Bakke applied, fifteen
regular applicants had numerical ratings higher than Bakke's, and
among the twenty regular applicants with ratings equal to Bakke's,
some were put on a waiting list, yet Bakke was not.61 In 1974, twenty
applicants were on the waiting list (again, Bakke was not), and twelve
additional applicants not on the waiting list had numerical ratings
higher than Bakke's.62 Thus, in both years, more than sixteen appli
cants had priority over Bakke.63
58. Bakke, 553 P.2d at 1 172; Modification of Opinion, supra note 54, at 80a.
59. The university had reason to be concerned about justiciability. Just three years be
fore Bakke reached the Supreme Court, the Court dismissed as moot a similar lawsuit
against the University of Washington Law School. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974). Moreover, a mere six months before the university filed its petition for certiorari, the
Court had held that, absent a showing that "plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision," a federal court lacks Article III jurisdiction.
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
60. Amici National Urban League, supra note 32, at 13.
61. Id. at 11-12. The numerical ratings, called "benchmark scores," were composite rat
ings of "the interviewers' summaries, the candidate's overall grade point average, grade
point average in science courses, scores on the [MCAT], letters of recommendation, extra
curricular activities, and other biographical data." Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 274 (1978).
62. See Amici National Urban League, supra note 32, at 12.
63. The university made several arguments in response, none of them convincing. See
Reply to Brief of Amici Curiae at 2-4, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, No. 76-811 (U.S.
filed Jan. 21, 1977) (on petition for writ of certiorari) [hereinafter Reply]. First, it pointed
out that "some offers of admission are declined" and that "the notion of inflexible 'priority'
is itself inaccurate, for benchmark ratings were not wholly determinative of admission." Id.
But these arguments are refuted by the testimony of Dr. Lowrey, the admissions committee
chairman, who consistently maintained that Bakke would have been denied admission ab
sent the quota. See Intended Decision, supra note 37, at 108a; Amici National Urban
League, supra note 32, at 11. Dr. Lowrey explained that " '[a]lmost every applicant offered a
place in the class after the middle of May [when Bakke's application was being considered]
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The university's strategic move garnered little attention at the
Supreme Court. Noting that "[s]everal amici suggest that Bakke lacks
standing," Justice Powell simply stated without explanation that the
university's stipulation was "not an attempt . . . to disguise actual facts
of record,"64 a conclusion difficult to square with the available evi
dence. He went on to clarify that "the University's decision not to
permit Bakke to compete for all 100 places in the class" was a suffi
cient injury to establish standing "even if Bakke had been unable to
prove that he would have been admitted in the absence of the special
program."65 Yet this determination does not render the university's
maneuver less suspect, for the university never advanced this theory of
standing before the Supreme Court. It relied instead on the validity of
its stipulation.66 Justice Powell reached his conclusion about standing
on his own, and the issue was not addressed by any other Justice in
Bakke.

attends the medical school,' " and he plainly characterized the fifteen applicants with
benchmark ratings higher than Bakke's in 1973 as being "ahead of Mr. Bakke." Amici Na
tional Urban League, supra note 32, at 11 (quoting Dr. Lowrey).
The university also cited a statement by the trial court that " 'there appears to the court
to be at least a possibility that [Bakke] might have been admitted absent the 16 favored posi
tions on behalf of minorities.' " Reply, supra, at 3 (quoting Intended Decision, supra note 37,
at 108a). But the university lifted this statement from a discussion in which the trial court
concluded that Bakke would not have been admitted absent the special program, see In
tended Decision, supra note 37, at 107a-108a, a conclusion unequivocally restated by the trial
court twice thereafter, see Addendum to Notice of Intended Decision, Bakke v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal. (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 1975) (No. 31287) (on file with author); Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 48, at 116a-ll 7a.
Finally, the university cited a report written by Dr. Lowrey in response to a Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare inquiry. The report said:
Mr. Bakke was found by the Admissions Committee to be a highly desirable candidate and
came very close to being offered a place in the entering class for the fall of 1973. The single
reason for his non-acceptan ce was the lack of available spa ce in that group; had additional
places been available, individuals with Mr. Bakke's rating would likely have been admit
ted . . . .
Reply, supra, a t 4 n.2 (quoting report). B ut the reference to "that group" is a reference to
"the entering class for the fall of 1973"; it is not a reference to the regular admissions pro
gram. The very most that could be inferred from the report's unremarkable citation to "the
Jack of available space" is that Bakke was in line for the l Olst seat, not the 85th.
In sum, it was far from "an impossible burden,'' Reply, supra, at 4, to show Bakke's in
admissibility absent the quota by a preponderance of the evidence. The record supports the
charge that "the University essentially gave up an air tight case in order to confer 'j urisdic
tion' on [the Supreme] Court." Amici National Urban League, supra note 32, at 16.
64. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280 n.14.

65. Id. at 280-81 n.14.
66. In i ts reply to amici's concerns about standing, the university asserted that " the law
does not require certainty of admission in order to establish standing." Reply, supra note 63,
at 2 (emphasis added). But nowhere did the university argue that the denial of opportunity
to compete for all 100 places was alone sufficient to establish standing. Rather, the university
argued that Bakke's inadmissibility absent the racial quota was not a certainty, see id. at 2-3,
and was sufficiently probable that attempting to prove otherwise would have amounted to
" trying to carry an impossible burden,'' id. at 4.
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In sum, Allan Bakke's admission to the Davis Medical School was
a quirk, a result orchestrated in the course of litigation based on con
siderations unrelated to the merits of his causal claim. From the record
of the lawsuit, the point worth emphasizing is not so much the ultimate
fact of Bakke's inadmissibility absent the special program. The point,
rather, is that Bakke's admissibility absent the special program would
have been exceptional, and the university's concession provides no
reason to believe otherwise. Bakke vindicated his claim that the "ra
cial quota . . . barred him - by reason of race alone - from attending
the school"67 not only against the facts, but more importantly against
overwhelming odds. For many unsuccessful white applicants, Bakke's
example legitimizes the instinct - against all odds - to blame af
firmative action. In this way, Bakke gives life to the causation fallacy.
But with a careful look beneath the surface, we see the fallacy laid
bare.
II.

THE BASIC ARITHMETIC OF SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS

As a legal ma.tter, Bakke held unlawful the voluntary use of racial
quotas in selective admissions.68 Yet the Court did not ban all uses of
race in admissions. In his opinion announcing the judgment of the
Court, Justice Powell famously pronounced that colleges and universi
ties may use race as one of many "plus" factors in admissions in order
to assemble a diverse student body.69 Although the status of Justice
Powell's opinion as legal authority is contested,70 the notion of race as
a "plus" factor has served for over twenty years as an organizing prin
ciple for the institutional practice and public understanding of affirma
tive action. The gold standard for such practice, according to Justice
Powell, is the admissions program used by Harvard College, where
"the race of an applicant may tip the balance in his favor just as geo-

67. Brief for Respondent at 63, Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(No. 76-811).
68. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-16, 319-20 (opinion of Powell, J.) (finding the quota unconsti
tutional); id. at 412-18, 421 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (finding the quota unlawful under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
69. Id. at 316-18 (opinion of Powell, J.).
70. Compare Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000)
("Justice Powell's analysis is the narrowest footing upon which a race-conscious decision
making process could stand" and is therefore the holding of the Court under Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)), with Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996)
("Justice Powell's argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never represented
the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case . . . . Justice Powell's view in
Bakke is not binding precedent on this issue.").
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graphic origin or a life spent on a farm may tip the balance in other
candidates' cases."71
The appeal of this approach is readily understood in light of the
conventional narrative of Bakke. Whereas racial quotas put a specified
number of seats beyond the reach of white applicants, the use of race
to "tip the balance" in close cases seems to impose a comparatively
minor detriment. Quotas are bad, the argument goes, because they are
rigid and because they expressly limit the number of opportunities for
which white applicants may compete. In contrast, the plus-factor ap
proach is flexible. It enables every applicant to compete for all ·avail
able seats in the class. And against a baseline of objective qualifica
tions, it places racial and nonracial plus factors "on the same footing
for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same
weight."72 Justice Powell's opinion tells us that Bakke was right to be
lieve that the medical school's racial quota cost him a letter of admis
sion. Unlike Bakke, however,
[t]he applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another candi
date receiving a "plus" on the basis of ethnic background will not have
been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because he
was not the right color or had the wrong surname. It would mean only
that his combined qualifications, which may have included similar non
objective factors, did not outweigh those of the other applicant.73

In other words, when race is used as a plus factor, affirmative action
cannot be said to have caused the rejection of a white applicant. Al
though race may be a pivotal factor at the end, it is only a minor con
sideration - a factor that "tips the balance" - against the backdrop
of the objective and nonobjective "combined qualifications" of each
white and minority applicant. So goes the conventional answer to the
conventional framing of the problem in Bakke: Because the use of
race in the form of a quota is understood to impose a heavy burden on
white applicants like Bakke, the solution is to limit the use of race by
reducing it to a mere tipping factor in close cases.
But this framing of the solution, no less than the framing of the
problem, does not correspond to empirical reality. The practice and
effects of affirmative action are not as transparent now as they were
before Bakke made quotas illegal.74 But recent scholarship and litiga
tion provide important insights that are indicative of general tenden71. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316 (quoting description of Harvard College admissions program).
72. /d. at 317.
73. Id. at 318.
74. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Cooper, Colleges Testing New Diversity Initiatives: Success Is
Uneven Without Traditional Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2000 , at A4 (observing
that more and more institutions are revising their admissions policies in response to changes
in the legal and political landscape).
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cies.75 Perhaps the most notable contribution in this vein is The Shape
of the River by William Bowen and Derek Bok, a comprehensive, lon
gitudinal study of admissions, academic and employment outcomes,
attitudes, and life experiences of over 80,000 black and white students
who studied at twenty-eight selective colleges and universities.76 Al
though Bowen and Bok's study, like all social science, is not perfect,77
it is powerful enough to confirm, as we shall see, that race continues to
play a major role in the admission of minority applicants, certainly a
much larger role than the image of a tipping factor suggests.

75. For recent scholarship, see, for example, Kane, supra note 13, at 431; Fredrick E.
Vars & William G. Bowen, Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores, Race, and Academic Perform
ance in Selective Colleges and Universities, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra
note 13, at 457; Robert C. Davidson & Ernest L. Lewis, Affirmative Action and Other Special
Consideration Admissions at the University of California, Davis, School of Medicine, 278
JAMA 1153 (1997); William C. Kidder, The Rise of the Testocracy: An Essay on the LSA T,
Conventional Wisdom, and the Dismantling of Diversity, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 167 (2000) ;
Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of
the Consequences of A bandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1997); and Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Ac
tion: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1996). In addition, the University
of Michigan litigation has yielded an impressive collection of empirical research demon
strating the relation between racial diversity and educational goals. See The Compelling
Need for Diversity in Higher Education at, http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/
expert/index.html (last modified Feb. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Compelling Need].
76. See BOWEN & BOK , supra note 8. The data in the study come from a huge database
called College and Beyond (C&B), built by the Andrew Mellon Foundation between 1994
and 1997. Id. at xxvii-xxx. The C&B database contains records of 80,000 undergraduate stu
dents who matriculated at twenty-eight selective colleges and universities in 1951, 1976 and
1989. Id. at xxvii-xxviii. The institutions include liberal arts colleges as well as research uni
versities. Id. at xxviii-xxix (listing the twenty-eight schools). Eight were among the top
twenty most selective schools in the nation, as measured by average SAT scores; another
thirteen were among the fifty-three next most selective schools; and the remaining seven
were among the 241 next most selective schools. Id. at xxix. Although the twenty-eight
schools are not representative of American higher education, they are representative of the
roughly 300 most selective schools in the country. Id. For purposes of studying affirmative
action, this is a highly relevant sample given the fact that racial preferences "are most pro
nounced at the most selective colleges." Kane, supra note 13, at 436-38 (showing through
empirical analysis that race plays little or no role in admissions decisions at the vast majority
of undergraduate institutions). The C&B database follows the students at these institutions
before, during, and after they attend college, yielding a rich array of data and sufficiently
large sample sizes to permit reliable comparisons among various groupings of students and
institutions. See BOWEN & BO K, supra note 8, at xxix-xxx. Although the study does not ex
amine minority students other than blacks, the data come from years (1951, 1976 and 1989)
in which blacks were the primary beneficiaries of affirmative action.
77. For critical reviews, see Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, Reflections on
The Shape of the River, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1583 (1999); Clifford Adelman, The Rest of the
River, u. Bus., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 42; and THREE VIEWS OF THE RIVER (Center for Equal
Opportunity ed., 1998), at http://www.ceousa.org/html/bok.html (Nov. 1998) (reviews by
Linda Chavez, Dave O'Neill and Roger Clegg). For more favorable reviews, see Ronald
Dworkin, Affirming Affirmative Action, N.Y. REV. BOOKS Oct. 22, 1998, at 91; Michael
Selmi, The Facts of Affirmative Action, 85 VA. L. REV. 697 (1999). A nicely balanced cri
tique is offered by Terrance Sandal ow, Minority Preferences Reconsidered, 97 MICH. L. REV.
1874 (1999).
,
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Yet even if the concept of race as a tipping factor is more rhetoric
than reality, that realization provides no basis for suspecting that racial
preferences significantly hinder white applicants' chances of success,
as the racial quota in Bakke purportedly did. The latter concern is, as
it was in Bakke, a direct consequence of the causation fallacy. Justice
Powell's distinction between racial quotas and the plus-factor ap
proach has always aroused suspicion,78 and there is little reason to be
invested in it once the causation fallacy is unraveled. As I explain be�
low, the asymmetry that characterizes the effect of racial quotas in
Bakke also characterizes the effect of affirmative action policies in
general. Affirmative action, while significantly benefiting minority ap
plicants, does not significantly burden white applicants.
A.

The Admissions Advantage for Minority Applicants

The most common approach to quantifying the degree of prefer
ence afforded by affirmative action is to compare average test scores
of white and minority applicants.79 Bowen and Bok's study shows that
although the black-white gap in SAT scores has narrowed considera
bly over the past three decades, especially at selective institutions,80 it
remains quite large. At the five institutions for which Bowen and Bok
had the most detailed admissions data,81 the average SAT score for
1989 black matriculants was 1157, while the average for white ma78. Justice Powell might be said to have invited the suspicion by writing, somewhat evasively, that his plus-factor approach
is flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular
qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration,

although not necessarily according them the same weight.

Indeed, the weight attributed to a
particular quality may vary from year to year depending upon the "mix" both of the student
body and the applicants for the incoming class.

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (opinion of Powell, J.) (emphasis added). The first to doubt Justice
Powell's approach was not a judicial or political conservative; it was Justice Brennan. In
Bakke, he wrote:
There is no sensible, and certainly no constitutional, distinction between, for example, add
ing a set number of points to the admissions rating of disadvantaged minority applicants as
an expression of the preference with the expectation that this will result in the admission of
an approximately determined number of qualified minority applicants and setting a fixed
number of places for such applicants as was done here.

Id. at 378 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

79. For well-known examples of this approach, see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277 n.7 (opinion
of Powell, J.); RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE:
INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 449-68 (1994); and STEPHAN
THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION,
INDIVISIBLE 397-409 (1997).
80. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 20-22, 30-31 & figs.2.6, 2.7.
81. The five institutions include three private universities and two co-ed liberal arts col
leges, "roughly representative" of the larger universe of twenty-eight selective four-year
colleges and universities they examined in their study. Id. at 17 n.4. Bowen and Bok did not
identify these schools because of promises of confidentiality. See id.
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triculants was 133182 - a difference of 174 points, or more than one
standard deviation. This gap provides some evidence of the effect of
racial preferences.
Importantly, however, racial preferences explain only some of the
gap. Although it is tempting to conclude that affirmative action is re
sponsible for the entire test score gap, that conclusion would be a mis
take. In addition to racial preferences, the gap in average SAT scores
of black versus white matriculants directly reflects the gap in average
SAT scores of black versus white applicants.83 Compared to whites
who apply to selective institutions, blacks are underrepresented at
higher SAT levels and overrepresented at lower SAT levels relative to
their proportion in the applicant pool.84 This means that even if selec
tive institutions admitted students solely on the basis of SAT score
with no racial preferences (e.g., by admitting applicants in rank order
until all the seats are filled, or by setting a minimum SAT threshold
above which all applicants are admitted), relatively more black admit
tees wo�ld be found at lower SAT levels, while relatively more white
admittees would be found at higher SAT levels. The resulting black
white gap would simply mirror, in slightly attenuated form, the gap in
average SAT scores between black and white applicants.85 As Bowen
and Bok correctly observe, "[t]he only way to create a class in which
black and white students had the same average SAT score would be to
discriminate against black candidates."86 In short, although racial gaps
in test scores suggest that affirmative action is probably at work, they
do not conclusively or validly indicate the magnitude of the effect.
The gap in average SAT scores between black and white applicants
suggests that under a race-neutral selection process, black applicants
would be less likely on average than white applicants to gain admis
sion to selective institutions. In fact, the opposite is true: At the five
institutions where Bowen and Bok examined the racial gap in SAT
scores, approximately 25% of white applicants gained admission for
the fall of 1989, compared to 42% of black applicants.87 With the test
score gap as a backdrop, this difference in admission rates begins to
82. Id. at 29; see also HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 79, at 452 (showing similar
black-white gaps in SAT scores at twenty-three selective institutions). At four of the five
institutions Bowen and Bok studied, they found that the average gap in SAT scores between
black and white matriculants narrowed by sixty-eight points between 1976 and 1989. See
BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 30. Given this trend, it is possible that the gap has narrowed
further between 1989 and 2000.
83. See Kane, supra note 13, at 433-35.
84. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 20 fig.2.2.
85. A similar gap would remain if selective institutions based admissions solely on class
rank as determined by high school grade point averages. See Kane, supra note 13, at 435.
86. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 16.
87. Id. at 26. Bowen and Bok clarify that "[w]hen we speak of 'applicants' we really
mean 'applications.' Id. at 18 n.5. Some applicants applied to more than one school in the
"
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provide a measure of the impact of racial preferences. Yet a difference
between a 25 % and a 42% likelihood of admission, though significant,
is not so large that it obviously demonstrates the use of race as more
than a tipping factor. Viewed one way, the data show that black appli
cants were 68% more likely than white applicants to be admitted.
Viewed another way, the data show that a substantial majority of both
white and black applicants did not receive offers of admission, and
that black applicants were only 23% less likely than white applicants
to be rejected.
Probability of Admission to Flve Selective Institutions
by SAT Score and Race, 1989
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As Bowen and Bok point out, however, comparing average rates
of admission for blacks and whites provides "an inaccurate picture of
the role played by race in the admissions process."88 A different pic
ture emerges when admission rates are disaggregated by SAT inter-

C&B database; thus, the true number of applicants is less than the number of applications.
Id. For present purposes, this distinction is immaterial as long as it is clear that the basic unit
of analysis is the selection decision (admission or rejection) reached for each discrete appli
cation.
88. Id. at 26.
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val:89 The figure above shows that while the likelihood of admission
generally increased with SAT score for both black and white appli
cants,90 blacks were admitted at a higher rate than whites at every SAT
interval.
A closer look at this gap in admission rates yields three observa
tions. First, the gap narrows as SAT scores become lower. At the two
most selective institutions within Bowen and Bok's sample, the admis
sion rates for blacks and whites with SAT scores below 1100 "were es
sentially the same (and in some cases actually slightly higher for the
low-scoring white applicants, a group that included some recruited
athletes)."91 These data suggest that racial preferences have little or no
effect at the low end of an institution's SAT distribution. Intuitively,
this makes sense: Selective institutions admit few applicants at the low
end of SAT scores, regardless of whether they are black or white.
Second, the gap also narrows as SAT scores become higher. This
gap-narrowing is primarily attributable to the sharp increase in the
rate of white admissions toward the high end of SAT scores. For white
applicants, the likelihood of admission rose from 30% at the 1350-1399
SAT interval to 63% at SAT scores of 1500 or above, whereas admis
sion rates for black applicants remained virtually the same (roughly
70% to 75% ) at the higher end of SAT scores.92 Racial preferences
appear to have some effect on admission rates at the high end of SAT
scores, but the size of the effect is not overwhelming. This also makes
sense: Selective institutions admit high proportions of applicants with
high SAT scores, regardless of whether they are black or white.
Third, the black-white gaps in admission rates are greatest in the
middle to upper-middle range of SAT scores, and the magnitude of
the gaps is striking. At the 1200-1249 SAT interval, 60% of blacks
were admitted, compared to 19% of whites. At the 1250-1299 interval,
74% of blacks were admitted, compared to 23% of whites. And at the
1350-1399 interval, 80% of blacks were admitted, compared to 31 % of

89. See id. at 27 fig.2.5. The precise values of the probabilities graphed in the figure ap
pear in infra, Appendix, Table A, lines 6 and 8.
90. The curve for black applicants becomes choppy at the higher end of SAT scores due
to the very small number of black applicants at these high SAT intervals. The underlying
data for the graph show that only 5% of black applicants had SAT scores in the 1300-1349
interval, 3.1 % scored 1350-1399, 1.3% scored 1400-1449, 0.5% (a total of twelve black appli
cants) scored 1450-1499, and 0.1 % (a total of two black applicants) scored over 1500. See
infra Appendix, Table A, lines 1 and 2. With larger samples, the figure likely approximates
an ellipse rotated at a slight angle.
91. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 43.
92. Infra Appendix, Table A, lines 6 and 8. Again, the admission rates for black appli
cants is choppy at the high end of SAT scores because of small numbers. The spike at the
right end of the curve reflects the fact that nine out of twelve black applicants scoring 14501499 on the SAT were admitted, while two out of two black applicants scoring 1500 or
higher were admitted. Infra Appendix, Table A, lines 2 and 7.
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whites.93 Within this range of SAT scores, black applicants were up to
three times more likely than whites to be admitted, even as white ap
plicants were up to three times more likely than blacks to be rejected.
These data suggest that racial preferences in selective admissions have
their greatest impact on applicants in the middle to upper-middle
range of SAT scores (1100 to 1399). Most applicants to selective
schools - 50% of blacks and 70% of whites - fall within this range.94
Thus, affirmative action gives minority applicants a substantial advan
tage in the range of SAT scores where the broad majority of white ap
plicants compete.
Differences in admission rates by SAT interval might overstate the
effect of racial preferences were it true that the differences reflect not
only the role of affirmative action, but also the influence of other se
lection criteria against which black applicants are more favorably situ
ated than white applicants with similar SAT scores. In other words,
controlling for additional factors might narrow the gap. There is rea
son to believe, however, that additional controls would not narrow the
gap by much and that Bowen and Bok's data on admission rates do
yield valid inferences about the effect of racial preferences.
First, it is well-established that SAT scores tend to overpredict the
undergraduate academic performance of black students relative to
white students. Consistent with other research,95 Bowen and Bok
found that within their sample of twenty-eight selective institutions,
the average class rank (based on four-year cumulative grade point av
erages) of black matriculants in 1989 was significantly lower than the
average rank of white matriculants within every SAT interval. Whereas
whites with SAT scores at or above 1300 ranked on average in the
60th percentile of their class, blacks with similar SAT scores ranked on
average in the 36th percentile. At lower SAT intervals, the size of this
gap remained between 22 and 25 percentile points.96 Although part of
this gap is likely attributable to black versus white students' experi
ences in college,97 at least some part is attributable to differences in
93. Infra Appendix, Table A, lines 6 and 8.
94. Infra Appendix, Table A, lines 1 and 3.
95. See LEONARD RAMIST ET AL., STUDENT GROUP DIFFERENCES IN PREDICTING
COLLEGE GRADES: SEX, LANGUAGE, AND ETHNIC GROUPS, College Board Report no. 931 (1994) (summarizing research); see also PATRICIA GANDARA, PRIMING THE PUMP:
STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF UNDERREPRESENTED MINORITY

43-44 (1999) (citing research confirming "the overprediction problem")
(available at <http://www.collegeboard.org>) (last visited Feb. 11, 2002); L. SCOTT MILLER,

UNDERGRADUATES

AN AMERICAN IMPERATIVE: ACCELERATING MINORITY EDUCATIONAL ADVANCEMENT

(1995) (same); Vars & Bowen, supra note 75, at 465-73.
96. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 75 fig.3.10. Even more striking is the finding that
black students with SAT scores at or above 1300 ranked on average 4 percentile points lower
than white students with SAT scores of less than 1000. Id.
97. See id. at 77 (finding that even after controlling for high school grades and socioeco
nomic status, a gap of 15 to 21 percentile points persists across all C&B schools); id. at 81-86
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academic preparation not captured by SAT scores.98 Black applicants,
the research shows, are somewhat less academically well-prepared
than white applicants with the same SAT scores.99
Second, black and white applicants with similar SAT scores might
not be similarly situated with respect to nonacademic admissions crite
ria. It is possible, for example, that proportionally more blacks than
whites within a given SAT interval come from economically disadvan
taged backgrounds.100 If an institution sought to achieve socioeco
nomic diversity as one of its admissions goals, then this might explain
part of the gap in admission rates between black and white applicants.

(discussing influences in the college environment that may affect academic outcomes for
black students); Vars & Bowen, supra note 75, at 473 (stating that substantial variance in the
black-white GPA gap from campus to campus suggests that college experiences play a role
in determining academic outcomes). For research suggesting that vulnerability to stereo
types may harm the college academic performance of black students, see Claude M. Steele &
Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Test Performance of Academically Successful Af
rican Americans, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 13, at 401-27.
98. Bowen and Bok found that controlling for black-white differences in high school
grades and socioeconomic status, in addition to SAT scores, gender, school selectivity, field
of study, and athlete status, closed the black-white gap in average class rank among students
in their entire sample of twenty-eight institutions by roughly 14 percentile points. BOWEN &
BOK, supra note 8, at 77. A more modest effect was observed in a study of 1989 matriculants
at eleven institutions within Bowen and Bok's sample; that study showed that controls for
socioeconomic status, including parental occupation and education, narrowed the black
white college performance gap by roughly 10%. Vars & Bowen, supra note 75, at 471 . At
one institution able to provide very detailed admissions data, more sophisticated controls
integrating several predictors of academic performance, including SAT and achievement test
scores, high school grades in core subjects, advanced placement data, and secondary school
quality, narrowed the gap by about 15%. See id. at 472.
99. Bowen and Bok suggest that the educational background of whites and blacks differ
in an array of unmeasurable and, in some cases, intangible resources, including "educational
aspirations," "the number of books at home," "opportunities to travel," "the nature of the
conversation around the dinner table," " 'at-home' education . . . in some instances because
of the presence of a 'stay-at-home Mom,' who has deliberately sacrificed family income,"
and "less pressure to take jobs during the school year" - factors not captured by black
white differences in socioeconomic status based on conventional measures, but likely corre
lated with black-white differences in wealth. Id. at 80-81; see also DALTON CONLEY, BEING
BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 55-81
(1999) (describing the intangible educational resources that wealth (i.e., ownership of assets)
provides, and arguing that black-white gaps in wealth, not income, largely explain black
white gaps in educational attainment). See generally MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M.
SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL
INEQUALITY (1995).
Importantly, however, black-white differences in academic preparation do not mean that
affirmative action sets minority students up for failure. Bowen and Bok's research provides
strong evidence that minority students who attend highly selective schools do not fare worse
and in fact fare better in terms of graduation rates, advanced degrees, earnings, and satisfac
tion with college than minority students with similar SAT scores who attend less selective
schools. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 59-68, 114-15, 142-44, 198-201.
100. Cf Kane, supra note 13, at 449 (among 1992 high school graduates with combined
reading and math scores in the top tenth of the class, only 6.1 % of whites but 17.2% of
blacks and Hispanics had income below $20,000).
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The same might be said about preferences for athletes.101 Yet it is
doubtful that controlling for the full range of nonacademic factors
would significantly narrow the wide gap in admission rates at the mid
dle to upper-middle range of SAT scores. It seems reasonable to be
lieve that special talents, personal accomplishments, leadership abili
ties, participation in extracurricular activities or community service,
and other nonacademic qualities valued by admissions officers are
evenly distributed across racial lines, or at least not significantly less
concentrated among white applicants than among blacks.102 Indeed,
within a given SAT interval, there is reason to suspect these qualities
might be more concentrated within the 20% to 25 % of white appli
cants who gain admission than within the 60% to 75% of black appli
cants who gain admission.103
Third, even if socioeconomic status accounts for part of the high
admission rates for blacks as compared to whites, this effect is offset
by the substantial preference given to applicants who are children of
alumni, a preference that works largely to the benefit of whites. In
Bowen and Bok's study, legacy preferences had a sizable effect on
admission rates within the SAT intervals where black-white gaps in
admission rates were largest.104 There is also evidence that geographic
101. The evidence suggesting that athletic preferences increase racial diversity is not
overwhelming. Subsequent to Bowen and Bok's research, the Mellon Foundation sponsored
a large-scale study of intercollegiate athletics. See JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAM G.
BOWEN, THE GAME OF LIFE: COLLEGE SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES (2001). Ex
amining data from thirty institutions varying in size and academic selectivity, that study con
cluded that "although athletics helps promote racial diversity, the impact is modest." Id. at
55. Although the recruitment of male athletes for high-profile sports (basketball, football,
and hockey) has "clearly helped to diversify campuses," id. at 54, "[t]he same statement can
not be made . . . for [l]ower [p]rofile sports . . . in which the percentage of male athletes who
were black was generally in the 3 to 4 percent range," id. at 54-55 & fig.2.8 (presenting 1989
data). Moreover, "[o]nly in the Division IA private universities has the presence of women
athletes increased the relative number of African American women." Id. at 136 & fig.6.6
(reporting 1989 data). Overall, "the pressure to increase athletic opportunities for women,
driven in large part by Title IX, cannot be said to have encouraged a greater degree of racial
diversity." Id. at 137.
102. Cf BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 31 ("[O]ne commonsense way of representing
(retrospectively) a process in which the race of the applicant was truly unknown to admis
sions officers is by assuming that black applicants, grouped by SAT ranges, would have the
same probability of being admitted as white applicants in those same ranges.").
103. The intuition here is that within any group of applicants with similar SAT scores
(say 1250-1299), there is a distribution ranging from those applicants who are exceedingly
accomplished or desirably well-rounded to those who are overly narrow, bookish, or other
wise lackluster. Assuming that the shape of this distribution is similar for blacks and whites
scoring 1250-1299, the relatively small fraction of white applicants offered admission (23 %)
is likely to include proportionally more candidates from the favorable end of the distribution
than the relatively large fraction of black applicants offered admission (74%).
104. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 29. At the 1200-1299 SAT interval, 35% of
legacy applicants were admitted, compared to 22% of non-legacy applicants and roughly
60% of black applicants. Id. At SAT scores at or above 1300, 60% of legacies were admitted,
compared to 24% of non-legacies and 70% of black applicants. Id. Although Bowen and
Bok do not tell us how many applicants had legacy status, other data suggest that the num-
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preferences disproportionately favor white applicants.105 Thus, con
trolling for alumni and geographic preferences would widen black�
white gaps in admission rates.
In sum, differences in admission rates based on SAT scores pro
vide a reasonably valid measure of the admissions advantage black
applicants receive through affirmative action. As suggested by the
Harvard College admissions policy featured in Bakke, racial prefer
ences operate not at the top or bottom of the applicant pool, but in
"the large middle group of applicants who are 'admissible' and
deemed capable of doing good work in their courses."106 Contrary to
what Bakke suggests, however, the race of a minority applicant in this
middle group does not merely "tip the balance in his favor."107 It con
fers a considerable advantage that is much more substantial than pro
ponents of affirmative action typically acknowledge.
Interestingly, Justice Powell's effort to downplay the role of race in
admissions finds a parallel twenty years later in Bowen and Bok's
work. Bowen and Bok, former university presidents who are long-time
supporters of affirmative action and whose institutions (Princeton and
Harvard, respectively) are featured in Bakke,108 decline to draw any
inference about the effect of racial preferences from the substantial
black-white gap in admission rates. Instead, they argue that:
[t]he best way to measure the degree of preference given is by comparing
the credentials of those black students who presumably would not have
been enrolled under a race-neutral standard . . . with the credentials of an
equivalent number of rejected applicants (mostly white) who would have
been admitted under a race-blind procedure.109

The first group, termed "retrospectively rejected" blacks,110 consists of
black matriculants who would have been rejected if "black applicants,

bers are not insignificant. See, e.g. , JEAN H. FETIER, QUESTIONS AND ADMISSIONS:
REFLECTIONS ON 100,000 ADMISSIONS DECISIONS AT STANFORD 75-76 (1995) ("[I)n a typi
cal year, about 5 percent of the applicants [to Stanford), and about 10-12 percent of the en
rolling freshman class, would be legacies."); id. at 76 (quoting an investigative finding by the
O ffice for Civil Rights at Harvard that "(i)n 1988 . . . 280 of 1,602 Harvard freshmen, more
than one in six, had fathers who had attended Harvard").
105. See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFI RMATIVE
ACTION 166, 235 n.75, 300 n.70 (1996). Recall that Justice Powell's paradigmatic example of
a geographic preference favors applicants from largely white rural areas over applicants
from more racially diverse urban areas: "A farm boy from Idaho can bring something to
Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 316 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Harvard College admissions policy).
106. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 316-17 (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Harvard's admissions policy); id. at
317 n.51 (quoting William Bowen's description of Princeton's admissions policy).
109. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 18.
1 10. Id. at 37.
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grouped by SAT ranges, [had] the same probability of being admitted
as white applicants in those same ranges."111 Against their qualifica
tions, Bowen and Bok would compare "the test scores and grades of
the bottom decile of the white students who were admitted," a group
they take to be a fair approximation of "the other students, presuma
bly mostly white and Asian Americans, who would have taken [the]
places" of retrospectively rejected blacks.112
Curiously, Bowen and Bok do not provide results of their pro
posed comparison for the five institutions where they had the most de
tailed admissions data. Instead, they discuss a recent study of thirty
selective law schools showing that while "the average LSAT score of
all white students was 24 percent higher than the average LSAT score
of all black students[,] this difference shrinks to 10 percent when . . .
the LSAT scores of the retrospectively rejected black students [are
compared] with the scores of the lower-ranked white students. "113 Pre
sumably, performing the same comparison using Bowen and Bok's
sample would produce a similar result.114
But the comparative method Bowen and Bok propose is flawed.
Given the nuance with which they describe the admissions process in
other parts of their book,115 it is surprising that, in characterizing the
magnitude of racial preferences, they assume that the applicants who
would replace retrospectively rejected blacks in a race-neutral admis
sion process are those with the academic qualifications of the bottom
decile of admitted white students. This assumption seems to imply that
selective institutions admit applicants in rank order based on test
scores and grades, such that opening up X number of seats through a
race-neutral process would enable an institution to admit the next X
applicants on the list. But selective admissions processes do not work
that way. Just as Bowen and Bok's retrospectively rejected blacks con
sist of black applicants up and down the SAT distribution, it is surely
more reasonable to believe that the "retrospectively admitted" whites
likewise would consist of applicants up and down the SAT distribu111. Id. at 31.
1 12. Id. at 37.
113. Id. at 37-38 (citing data supplied in Personal Correspondence from Linda
Wightman, former Vice President for Testing, Operations, and Research, Law School Ad
missions Council).
114. At Bowen and Bok's sample of five selective institutions, the average SAT score of
black applicants who would have been rejected under their race-neutral model was 1145. Id.
at 42. Within the entire sample of C&B institutions, 12% of white admittees had SAT scores
lower than 1200, and nearly half of this group had scores in the 1150-1199 interval. See infra
Appendix, Table A, line 9. Assuming Bowen and Bok are correct that their sample of five
institutions is "roughly representative" of the C&B pool, BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 17
n.4, this rough comparison suggests that the test score gap between retrospectively rejected
black applicants and the bottom decile of white admittees is indeed small.
115. See, e.g., BOWEN & BOK at 23-29.
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tion, not simply those in the bottom decile. In other words, if a race
neutral admissions policy made available X seats for an institution to
fill, why would it fill those seats with applicants whose qualifications
mirrored those of the bottom of the class? The more likely scenario is
that the institution, following its usual selection process, would in
crease white admission rates proportionally at every SAT interval. The
average SAT score of the resulting pool of retrospectively admitted
white students would be roughly the same as the average for all admit
ted whites, and the difference between this number and the average
SAT score of retrospectively rejected blacks would be quite large. 1 16
Moreover, Bowen and Bok's approach to measuring the effect of
racial preferences, even when properly executed, is unilluminating for
the same reason they themselves criticize black-white comparisons of
average SAT scores.1 1 7 Such comparisons fail to distinguish between
the true effect of racial preferences and the large preexisting gap be
tween the SAT distributions of white and black applicants. The under
representation of black applicants relative to whites at the high end of
SAT scores, along with the overrepresentation of blacks relative to
whites at the low end, means that differences in average SAT scores of
black and white admittees cannot be reliably attributed to the impact
of affirmative action. Examining admission rates for black and white
applicants with similar SAT scores avoids the problem of the preex
isting test score gap and thus provides a more sensible approach to
characterizing the effect of racial preferences.
B.

The Admissions Disadvantage for White Applicants

Whether intended or not, Bowen and Bok's effort to minimize the
admissions advantage enjoyed by minority applicants appears to re
flect a felt need to harmonize the actual practice of affirmative action
with the policy design that Justice Powell thought constitutionally
permissible. With Princeton and Harvard as his models, Justice Powell
elaborated the plus-factor approach as an alternative to racial quotas.
For Justice Powell, the difference in design was critical. Unlike Bakke,
who successfully argued that the medical school's quota cost him a let
ter of admission, a white applicant who loses a seat to a minority ap
plicant when race is used as a tipping factor may infer "only that his
combined qualifications, which may have included similar nonobjec116. Bowen and Bok do not provide the average SAT scores of white and black appli
cants admitted to their sample of five selective institutions. But using the average SAT score
of white applicants (1284) as the lowest possible approximation of the average SAT score of
white admittees, see id. at 29, we find that the average test score gap between white admit
tees and retrospectively rejected blacks (1145) is at least 139 points (1284 - 1 1 45). The actual
gap is likely closer to 186 points, which is the difference between the average score of white
matriculants (1331) and the average score of retrospectively rejected blacks (1 145).
117. See id. at 16-17.

March 2002]

The Causation Fallacy

1073

tive factors, did not outweigh those of the other applicant."1 18 That in
ference is certainly correct. But the validity of the inference, while
giving the plus-factor approach a greater appearance of fairness than
racial quotas,119 ultimately has nothing to do with using race as a mere
plus factor. It is instead dictated by the same statistical realities that
compel the inference that Bakke's rejection was most likely attribut
able to his combined qualifications and not the racial quota. In other
words, what matters in determining the most reasonable causal infer
ence is not the format of affirmative action that an institution chooses,
but rather the basic arithmetic of selective admissions.
Consider, for example, the basic outline of Jennifer Gratz's lawsuit
against the University of Michigan, a leading test case likely to end up
at the Supreme Court this year. Gratz, who applied in 1994 for admis
sion as an undergraduate, claims that the university discriminated
against her not by using a racial quota, but by admitting minority stu
dents at much higher rates than it admitted white students with similar
high school grades and SAT scores. Among applicants with grades and
scores comparable to hers, all forty-six minorities (100%) - but only
121 out of 378 whites (32%) - gained admission.120 Relying on this
disparity in admission rates, Gratz contends that she would have been
admitted were it not for racial preferences.121
Whereas Bakke's case was built on racial differences in average
grades and test scores, Gratz's case is built on racial differences in ad
mission rates. But Gratz, like Bakke, is seeking to advance the causa
tion fallacy in defiance of basic arithmetic. In the year Gratz applied, a
total of 424 applicants (378 whites plus forty-six minorities) had grades
and test scores comparable to hers; a total of 167 were admitted (121
whites plus forty-six minorities). Under the university's race-conscious
admissions policy, white applicants had a 32% chance of admission
( 121 divided by 378). Had the university admitted applicants at the
same overall rate regardless of race, the average likelihood of admis
sion for white and minority applicants would be 39% (167 divided by
118. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978).
119. See id. at 319 n.53 (opinion of Powell, J.) (favoring the plus-factor approach over
racial quotas on the ground that " 'Ll]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice' " (quoting
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.)) (alteration in original)).
120. Brief for Jennifer Gratz et al. at 17-18, Gratz v. Bollinger (6th Cir. May 7, 2001)
(Nos. 01-1333, 01-1416, 01-1418), available at www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/ (last
visited April 16, 2002).
121. Although Gratz, having enrolled and graduated from another college, does not
seek an order of admission to the University of Michigan, she does seek damages resulting
from her denial of admission. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 815, 816 (E.D.
Mich. 2000) (observing that Gratz filed, among other things, a § 1983 action for monetary
relief); see also Complaint 'II 25, Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000)
(No.
97-75231 ),
available
at
http://www .umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/gratz/
gratzham.html (last modified Feb. 4, 2002) ("As a result of defendants' racially discrimina
tory procedures and practices, plaintiffs' applications were rejected.").

Michigan Law Review

1074

[Vol. 100:1045

424). In other words, affirmative action increased the average likeli
hood of rejection for white applicants from 61 % to 68% . Affirmative
action, to be sure, had some effect. But the key point is that admis
sions decisions concerning white applicants remain, on average, far
better explained by an applicant's combined qualifications than by the
effect of affirmative action.
In Gratz, as in Bakke, the smallness of the pool of minority appli
cants and the relevance of nonobjective criteria in selecting among
large numbers of white applicants conspire to limit the effect on white
applicants of substantial preferences for minority applicants. Using
data from Bowen and Bok's study, it is possible to generalize the sta
tistical result observed in Gratz. Their data permit a rough comparison
between the actual likelihood of admission for white applicants within
a certain SAT interval and the hypothetical likelihood of admission
for those white applicants under a race-neutral selection process.
As in Gratz's case, the hypothetical race-neutral likelihood of ad
mission for all applicants within a given SAT interval may be esti
mated by dividing the total number of applicants actually admitted by
the total number of applicants. This assumes that admissions officers
would admit applicants with similar SAT scores (black or white) at the
same rate, and that the number of applicants actually admitted within
a given SAT interval equals the number that would have been admit
ted under a race-neutral process. Within the 1200-1249 SAT interval,
for example, Bowen and Bok's five selective institutions admitted 543
out of 2816 white applicants and 147 out of 245 black applicants in
1989
a total of 690 out of 3061 applicants.122 Thus, the hypothetical
likelihood of admission for an average applicant (white or black)
scoring 1200-1249 on the SAT would have been 22.5 % (690 divided by
3,061)
only slightly higher than the actual 19.3% rate of admission
for whites in this SAT interval.123 The fact that the actual rate of ad
mission for black applicants within this SAT interval was 60% (indeed,
considerably higher than the actual rate for whites) is relevant to un
derstanding the benefit of being black, but irrelevant to understanding
the burden that racial preferences imposed on white applicants.
-

-

122. Infra Appendix, Table A, lines 2, 4, S, 7, 9 and 10.
123. See infra Appendix, Table A, lines 8 and 1 1 .
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TABLE l
ACTUAL RATES VERSUS RACE-NEUTRAL RATE
OF ADMISSION FOR B LACK AND WHITE APPLICANTS124

Actual rate of
admission for
black aeelicants

Actual rate of
admission for
white aeelicants

Race-neutral rate
of admission for
all aeelicants

100.0%

63.0%

63.2%

1450-1499

75.0%

51.1%

51.1 %

1400-1449

69.6%

39.9%

40.3%

1350-1399

80.0%

30.7%

31.7%

1300-1349

64.6%

25.0%

26.2%

1250-1299

73.9%

22.6%

25.7%

1200-1249

60.0%

19.3%

22.5%

1 150-1199

55.5 %

18.7%

22.9%

1 100-1149

46.2%

13.3%

18.2%

1050-1099

40.6%

12.4%

18.6%

1 000-1049

35.4%

9.6%

16.8%

<1000

17.0%

3.3%

8.6%

SAT
interval
1500+

As Table 1 shows, eliminating racial preferences leaves the rate of
admission for white applicants virtually unchanged at the high end of
SAT scores (1300 and above), where the number of black applicants is
especially small. Although the difference between the actual and hy
pothetical race-neutral admission rates for white applicants increases
from roughly 3 to 5 percentage points as SAT scores decrease from
1300 to 1100, the advantage of race neutrality for white applicants re
mains small at precisely the SAT intervals where the advantage of race
consciousness for black applicants is largest. The advantage of race
neutrality appears to accrue primarily to white applicants at the low
end of the SAT range (below 1100). There the difference between ac
tual and hypothetical admission rates for whites approaches 7 percent
age points, largely because the number of black applicants who would
be denied admission under a race-neutral process is substantial rela
tive to the total number of white applicants. However, since selective
institutions admit so few applicants (black or white) in this low range,
the advantage of race neutrality is more illusory than real. At SAT
scores below 1000, for example, a white applicant who faced a 96.7%
124. For methodology and calculations, see infra Appendix, Table A.
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likelihood of rejection can hardly argue that race-consciousness cost
her a letter of admission when she would have faced a 91.4% likeli
hood of rejection under a race-neutral process. For applicants facing
such long odds, the marginal effect of affirmative action is just that marginal.
Moreover, there is reason to believe that the effect of affirmative
action is even more marginal than the hypothetical race-neutral ad
mission rates in Table 1 suggest. Those rates were calculated on the
assumption that the total number of applicants actually admitted
within a given SAT interval fairly approximates the total number that
would have been admitted under a race-neutral process. But that as
sumption almost certainly overestimates the number of admittees in
the absence of racial preferences. The reason has to do with black
white differences in "yield," the rate at which applicants offered ad
mission actually accept the offer. As Bowen and Bok explain, when
admissions processes use racial preferences, the yield "tends to be
lower for highly qualified black candidates than for comparable white
candidates because the black candidates are likely to be admitted by
more schools."125 At the five institutions for which Bowen and Bok
had the most detailed data, the average black-white difference in yield
was 14 percentage points in 1989.126 White applicants scoring 1 100 to
1349 on the SAT accepted offers of admission more than 50% of the
time, whereas comparable black applicants accepted offers only 30%
to 40% of the time.127
In the absence of racial preferences, however, the rate at which
black applicants accept offers of admission "would almost surely rise"
and "would move up toward the white yield."128 In other words, " [i]f
all institutions of higher education were required to adopt race-neutral
admissions policies . . . the typical black candidate who was still ac
cepted by any given school would presumably have fewer options. "129
One would expect to see black applicants accept offers at the same
rate as white applicants if both are admitted at the same rate and face
the same array of options. The elimination of affirmative action thus
means that selective institutions would not need to make as many of
fers of admission as they otherwise would in order to fill the same
number of seats. By decreasing the total number of offers required to
produce the same number of matriculants, the projected increase in
125. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 33-34. For the same reason, the yield for black or
white applicants tends to decrease as SAT scores increase, indicating that applicants with
higher SAT scores are likely to have more choices than applicants with lower SAT scores.
See id. at 34 & fig.2.9.
126. See id. at 34 n.18.
127. Id. at 34 fig.2.9.
128. Id. at 35.
129. Id.
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black yield tends to lower the hypothetical race-neutral rate of admis
sion.130
Using Bowen and Bok's data on yield, it is possible to adjust the
hypothetical race-neutral admission rates in Table 1 to account for this
additional factor. As we observed earlier, for example, in 1989 the five
schools in Bowen and Bok's sample admitted 543 out of 2816 white
applicants and 147 out of 245 black applicants scoring 1200 to 1249 on
the SAT, a total of 690 out of 3061 applicants.131 Within that SAT in
terval, 53.4% of whites and 31.9% of blacks accepted offers of admis
sion, 132 which means that roughly 290 whites and forty-seven blacks, or
. a total of 337 students, accepted offers.133 In the absence of racial pref
erences, how many applicants would the five schools need to admit in
order to gain 337 acceptances? If the yield for white applicants, 53.4%,
provides a good estimate of the yield for all applicants (black or white)
under a race-neutral process, then a total of 631 applicants would need
to be admitted,134 slightly less than the 690 applicants actually admitted
under race-conscious policies. The resulting race-neutral admission
rate, now adjusted for yield, is 20.6% ,135 even lower than the unad
justed race-neutral rate of 22.5% and only marginally higher than the
19.3% admission rate that white applicants actually faced. As Table 2
. shows, adjusting for yield produces similar results within every SAT
interval, confirming that the impact of racial preferences on the odds
of admission facing white applicants is remarkably slight.

130. Of course, this observation assumes that the elimination of affirmative action
would not cause selective institutions to expand the number of seats in their entering classes.
I see no reason why such expansion would occur.
131. Infra Appendix, Table A, lines 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, and 10.
132. Infra Appendix, Table B, lines 1 and 4.
133. 53.4% x 543 whites = 290 whites. 31.9% x 147 blacks = 47 blacks. 290 whites + 47
blacks = 337 students total. See infra Appendix, Table B, Jines 3, 6, and 7.
134. 631 x 53.4% = 337. See infra Appendix, Table B, line 8.
135. 631

+

3061

=

.206. See infra Appendix, Table B, line 10.
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TABLE 2
ACTUAL RATE VERSUS YIELD-ADJUSTED RACE-NEUTRAL
RATE OF ADMISSION FOR WHITE APPLICANTS136

Actual rate of
admission for
white applicants

Yield-adjusted
race-neutral
admission rate

Unadjusted
race-neutral
admission rate

1500+

63.0%

62.7%

63.2%

1450-1499

51.1%

50.8%

51.1%

1400-1449

39.9%

39.8%

40.3%

1350-1399

30.7%

30.8%

31.7%

1300-1349

25.0%

25.4%

26.2%

1250-1299

22.6%

23.8%

25.7%

1200-1249

19.3%

20.6%

22.5%

1 150-1199

18.7%

20.9%

22.9%

1100-1149

13.3%

16.2%

18.2%

1050-1099

12.4%

15.5%

18.6%

1000-1049

9.6%

1 1 .7%

16.8%

<1000

3.3%

6.7%

8.6%

SAT
interval

To summarize, there is no doubt that receiving a rejection letter
from a selective institution is a considerable disappointment. But the
reflexive tendency to blame affirmative action runs counter to basic
reasoning and empirical evidence. In any highly selective competition
where white applicants greatly outnumber minority applicants, and
where multiple objective and nonobjective criteria are relevant, the
average white applicant will not fare significantly worse under a selec
tion process that is race-conscious than under a process that is race
neutral. The articulation of this arithmetic truth provides a necessary
antidote to the rhetorical excesses of affirmative action's critics.
Ill.

NOT ALL WHITE APPLICANTS ARE CREATED EQUAL

In addition to loosening the grip that the Bakke narrative has had
on the affirmative action debate, dispelling the causation fallacy gives
rise to a variety of legal implications for white plaintiffs challenging
affirmative action. Those implications, the subject of this Part, are not
136. For methodology and calculations, see infra Appendix, Table B.
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immediately apparent from studying the marginal effect of racial pref
erences on white admissions probabilities. So far I have focused on
admissions probabilities in order to highlight the improbability of the
causal inference at the core of the Bakke narrative. But admissions
probabilities, while useful for describing how affirmative action affects
white applicants on average, do not capture the mechanics and impact
of affirmative action at the level of individual applicants. The odds
facing the hypothetical "average white applicant" present only a com
posite report of the discrete experiences of many individual applicants.
What matters in a lawsuit, of course, is not the treatment of the aver
age white applicant, but rather the treatment of the individual appli
cant who has chosen to become a plaintiff.137
Thus, this Part examines what is happening to individual white ap
plicants in the admissions process underneath the probabilities. The
conventional Bakke narrative, we have already discovered, does not
provide a complete account of how affirmative action affects white
applicants. This Part elucidates two additional narratives that are quite
different and, as a statistical matter, more significant. These alterna
tives to the Bakke narrative suggest important differences in the way
affirmative action impacts white applicants - differences obscured by
the causation fallacy yet essential to adjudicating their legal claims.
A.

Two Kinds of Injury

In exploring the legal implications of the causation fallacy, it is im
portant to clarify at the outset what the illogic of the fallacy does not
imply: It does not imply that intentional discrimination poses no ac
tionable problem so long as it inflicts little or no consequential harm.
Although the basic arithmetic of selective admissions dictates that the
vast majority of white applicants who are rejected under a race
conscious admissions process would likewise be rejected under a race
neutral process, those applicants nevertheless have a legitimate
ground for complaint under well-established equal protection norms.
As the district court in Hopwood observed, "there are two types of
injury in a case involving the . . . use of racial preferences":138 a "tangi
ble type of injury . . . [that] occurs when a plaintiff is actually denied
some right or benefit, such as admission to [a] school," and "an intan
gible injury" that occurs when "the government's discriminatory clas
sification . . . prevents a plaintiff from 'competing on an equal footing'
with other applicants."139 In a series of recent decisions, the Supreme
137. The right to equal opportunity is a "personal right." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); see also id. ("[T)he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution protect persons, not groups.").
138. Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872, 883 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
139. Id. (citation omitted).
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Court has made clear that "the inability to compete on an equal foot
ing" is a sufficient injury for constitutional standing to challenge af
firmative action, even without any allegation that the plaintiff "would
have obtained the benefit but for the "[discriminatory] barrier."140
Justice Powell made this point in Bakke when he noted that "even if
Bakke had been unable to prove that he would have been admitted in
the absence of the special program, it would not follow that he lacked
standing."141 "[A]part from the failure to be admitted," Bakke suffered
a cognizable injury from "the University's decision not to permit [him]
to compete for all 100 places in the class." 1 42
The causation fallacy thus does not speak directly to the unfairness
of being denied the opportunity to compete on an equal footing. In
deed, both Bakke and Bowen and Bok's study indicate that white ap
plicants, even those who would not have been admitted under a race
neutral process, would have faced substantially better odds of admis
sion had they not been white. This fact is quite instructive, for it sug
gests an ambiguity in what it means to say that the rejection of a white
applicant was "caused" by affirmative action. The causal claim could
mean, as it does in the Bakke narrative, that the white applicant would
have been admitted had the admissions process employed no racial
preferences. Alternatively, it could mean, as it does in an equal
footing complaint, that the applicant would have been admitted had
he been given the same preference as minority applicants. To consider
what would have happened to a white applicant had he been black is
not equivalent to considering what would have happened to that ap
plicant had the admissions process been race-neutral.
As I explain below, this distinction turns out to be important for
differentiating among white applicants and their legal claims. The two
kinds of injury attributable to affirmative action enable us to distin
guish three kinds of rejected white applicants: One genuinely fits the
Bakke narrative but rarely appears in court; one has standing to pur
sue an equal-footing claim, with some limitations; and one lacks
standing to challenge affirmative action altogether.

140. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville,
508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993); see also Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999) (per curiam) ("The
relevant injury in such cases is 'the inability to compete on an equal footing.' " (quoting
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. at 666)); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 211 ("The injury in cases of this kind is
that a 'discriminatory classification prevent[s] the plaintiff from competing on an equal
footing.' The aggrieved party 'need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but
for the barrier in order to establish standing.' " (alteration in original) (internal citations
omitted)).
141. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280-81 n.14 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
142. Id. at 281 n.14.
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Three Kinds of White Applicants

The clearest way to develop this typology is to examine the me
chanics of the admissions process and the outcomes for individual ap
plicants in specific cases. Three
helpful examples happen to occur to
.
gether in a recent lawsuit brought by a trio of white plaintiffs Ashley Davis, Craig Green, and Kirby Tracy - challenging the
University of Georgia's undergraduate admissions policies.143 Al
though the latest version of the university's affirmative action policy
was recently struck down by the Eleventh Circuit in a different law
suit, 144 the case filed by Davis, Green, and Tracy nonetheless provides
an opportune window for observing the effects of affirmative action
within the large and diverse sea of white applicants.
The university, Georgia's flagship institution, maintains a competi
tive admissions process in which applicants far exceed the number of
available seats.145 In 1995, when Tracy applied,, the university had an
official policy of admitting students on the basis of minimum SAT
scores, high school grade point averages ("GPAs"), and academic in
dex scores (a weighted composite of SAT scores and GPAs). Black
applicants were admitted if they had at least an 800 SAT score, a 2.0
GPA, and a 2.0 academic index; white applicants had to have at least a
980 SAT score, a 2.5 GPA, and a 2.4 academic index.146 Tracy had a
GPA of 3.47 and an SAT score of 830. Because he did not meet the
minimum requirements for white applicants, the university rejected his
application. It was undisputed that Tracy would have been admitted
had he been black.147 Based on uncontested evidence introduced by
the university, however, the district court determined .that Tracy still
would not have been admitted under a race-neutral process.148
143. The chronology of that litigation is as follows: Wooden v. Board of Regents of
University System of Georgia, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Ga. 1999) (ruling on Kirby Tracy
and Ashley Davis); Tracy v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, 59 F. Supp.
2d 1314 (S.D. Ga. 1999) (ruling on Craig Green); Tracy v. Board of Regents of University
System of Georgia, 208 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (vacating and remanding to the district
court for reconsideration in light of Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18 (1999)); Tracy v. Board of
Regents of University System of Georgia, No. CV 497-45, 2000 WL 1123268 (S.D. Ga. June
16, 2000) (reinstating prior opinions); Wooden v. Board of Regents of University System of
Georgia, 247 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001) (dismissing in part, affirming in part, reversing and
vacating in part, and remanding to the district court). "Wooden" is the name of one of three
additional plaintiffs who argued that Georgia's continued operation of historically black in
stitutions unlawfully discriminates against nonblacks. After the district court dismissed the
Wooden plaintiffs for lack of standing, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed them for failure to file
a timely notice of appeal. See Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1264.
144. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
145. See Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1265.
146. See Wooden, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 1374 (describing 1995 standard for "automatic ad
mission").
147. See id.; Wooden, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 1374.
148. Tracy, 2000 WL 1123268, at *7, *11 (citing the record).
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The university revised its admissions policy in 1995 out of concern
about the constitutionality of its two-track system. The revised policy,
which took effect in 1996, divided the admissions process into three
stages. In the first stage, the university selected the majority of its
freshman class purely on the basis of objective criteria; applicants with
minimum academic index and SAT scores were automatically admit
ted.149 In 1996, applicants with an academic index of at least 2.6 were
a�tomatically admitted; in 1997, the cut-off was 2.5.150 Among appli
cants not automatically admitted, the university then selected a subset
for further evaluation. In 1996, applicants with an academic index be
tween 2.3 and 2.6 moved to the second stage of the admissions process;
in 1997, applicants with an academic index between 2.25 and 2.5
moved forward.151 All others were automatically rejected. In the sec
ond stage, the university calculated what it called a "total student in
dex" ("TSI") based on a combination of academic and demographic
factors, including in-state residence, alumni relationships, and (until
last year) race.152 Applicants above a certain TSI threshold were ad
mitted, while applicants below a certain threshold were rejected. Ap
plicants in the middle went on to a third stage, called the "edge read,"
in which two readers re-evaluated each applicant on the basis of race
neutral criteria and assigned a score from -2.0 to +2.0.153 Applicants
above a certain score were admitted; the rest were rejected. An appli
cant's TSI score had no weight in the edge read.154
Ashley Davis, who applied in 1996, had an SAT score of 980, a
GPA of 2.94, and an academic index score of 2.21. Because her aca
demic index was below the 2.3 cut-off for advancing to the second
stage of the admissions process, the university turned down her appli
cation.155 Craig Green, who applied in 1997, had an SAT equivalency
score of 1170 to 1190, a GPA of 3.3, and an academic index score of
149. Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1266; see also Wooden, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 1374. In 1996, the
university selected 75% of its class in the first stage. Id. In 1997, it selected 88% of its class in
the first stage. Tracy, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1316.
150. Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1266. Neither the court of appeals nor the district court indi
cated the minimum SAT score required for automatic admission.
151. Id. Those applicants also had to meet a minimum SAT score, which the court of
appeals and district court again do not indicate.
152. Id. at 1266 & n.4. In the summer of 2000, following an adverse district court deci
sion in the Johnson litigation, the university decided to stop considering race as a factor in
undergraduate admissions until the Johnson litigation is resolved. See Johnson v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2001).
153. Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1266-67; see also Tracy, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1317. "Despite ex
tensive discovery, Green has not been able to show that UGA racially classified applicants at
the [edge read) stage." Tracy, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1318; id. at 1318 n.2 ("While Green has
shown that the edge readers engage in a subjective process, the record evidence permits no
reasonable inference that race plays a factor at this stage.").
154. See id. at 1317 ("[A)t the [edge read) stage, all applicants started at zero.").
155. Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1266.
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2.39.156 Although his scores were too low for automatic admission at
the first stage, they were high enough to move his application to the
second stage. At that stage, Green received a TSI score of 3.89, which
included points for his Georgia residency, his parents' educational
level, and his academic qualifications. He did not receive the 0.5-point
credit given to nonwhite applicants that year. In 1997, the threshold
for admission at the second stage was a TSI score of 4.40, and the
threshold for rejection was 3.79. Because Green's TSI score fell in the
middle, his application went to the third stage. Both edge readers wlio
reviewed Green's application gave him the lowest score of -2.0. Be
cause the cut-off for third-stage admission in 1997 was an edge read
score of -0.5, Green was rejected.157
Tracy, Davis, and Green sued the university, challenging its race
conscious admissions process on various constitutional and statutory
grounds. A close look at each plaintiff makes clear that not all of them
were in a position to challenge the university's use of racial prefer
ences. Moreover, the differences among them suggest a three
dimensional typology of unsuccessful white applicants.

Category 1: Ashley Davis and Craig Green
Let us look first at Ashley Davis. Davis was rejected under an ad
missions policy that took race into account only in the second stage of
the selection process, but not in the first or third. Davis never reached
the second stage; her application was turned down at the first stage
because her academic index score did not meet the race-neutral
threshold for avoiding automatic rejection. Racial preferences thus
played no role in the university's decision. Indeed, not only would
Davis have been rejected had there been no affirmative action at the
second stage, she also would have been rejected had she been non
white. For this reason, the district court and Eleventh Circuit correctly
concluded that Davis lacked standing to assert that the university de
nied her an opportunity to compete on an equal footing with all other
applicants.158
What Davis's example suggests is that, for many white applicants,
failure to gain admission has nothing to do with race.159 Bowen and
156. Tracy, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1317. Green scored 27 on a different college entrance
exam, the ACT, which translated into an SAT score of 1 170 to 1190. See id.
157. Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1267.
158. See id. at 1281-82 ("Simply put, at the only stage during which Davis's application
was considered by UGA, she was plainly on an equal footing with all other applicants, and
was deemed unqualified according to entirely race-neutral criteria."); Tracy v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. CV 497-45, 2000 WL 1 123268, at *10 (S.D. Ga. June 16,
2000); Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 32 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1375-76 (S.D. Ga.
1999).
159. See Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872, 883 (W.D. Tex. 1998) on remand (Sparks,
J.) ("There is no basis in fact or logic to suggest . . . that all [white] applicants who were de-
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Bok's statistical portrait of selective admissions confirms this point.
The disparities in admission rates in their study show that the average
white applicant is treated less favorably than the average black appli
cant, especially in the middle range of SAT scores. But again, what
matters in a lawsuit is not how racial preferences affect the average
white applicant, but rather how they affected the individual plaintiff.160
In the 1200-1249 SAT interval, for example, although white applicants
as a group would have had a 60% (instead of 19%) chance of admis
sion had they been black,161 the fact is that among white applicants
facing a 60% success rate, 40% would still fail to gain admission. Like
Ashley Davis, the white applicants in that 40% cannot claim they
would have been admitted absent affirmative action, nor can they
claim they were denied an opportunity to compete on equal footing
with black applicants.
The percentage of white applicants like Ashley Davis varies from
one SAT interval to another: 44% in the 1 150-1 199 range, 26% in the
1250-1299 range, 20% in the 1350-1399 range.162 But taking into ac
count the number of white applicants within each SAT interval,
Bowen and Bok's data show that even if white applicants within each
SAT interval were admitted at the rate for black applicants (ignoring
practical limits on the total number of seats available), 36% of all
white applicants - or nearly half of all rejected white applicants still would not have gained admission.163 This finding seems at once
remarkable and unremarkable. It is remarkable because the conven
tional Bakke narrative contains not the slightest hint that affirmative
nied admission . . . were denied admission substantially - or, for that matter, even in small
part - because of race."); id. at 884 ("[A)n applicant who has no conceivable chance of ad
mission cannot possibly show that race was a substantial or motivating factor in the . . .
school's decision to deny him or her admission.").
160. See supra note 1 37; see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) ("(I)t is the individual who is entitled to judicial protection
against classifications based upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions
impinge upon personal rights, rather than the individual only because of his membership in a
particular group . . . " (emphasis added)).
.

161. Infra Appendix, Table A, lines 6 and 8.
162. Had they been black, white applicants in the 1 150-1199, 1250-1299 and 1350-1399
intervals would have faced admission rates of 56%, 74% and 80%, respectively, which means
26%, 20%, and 44% of those applicants would have been rejected regardless of race. Infra
Appendix, Table A, line 6.
163. Bowen and Bok's study included 24,700 white applicants. From lines 4 and 6 of Ta
ble A in the Appendix, it is possible to calculate the number of white applicants that would
have been admitted had they been black: (.170)(1062) + (.354)(593) + (.406)(939) +
(.462)(1507) + (.555)(2,075) + (.600)(2816) + (.739)(3384) + (.646)(3878) + (.800)(3532) +
(.696)(2766) + (.750)(1507) + (1.00)(642) 15,839. If 15,839 white applicants would have
been admitted under the admission rates for black applicants, then 8861
or 35.9% would have been rejected. Summing the figures in line 9 of Table A, we find that 6433 white
applicants were actually admitted, which means 18,267 were actually rejected. The percent
age who still would have been rejected under the black admission rates is 8861 divided by
18,267, or 48.5%.
=

-
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action is wholly irrelevant to the fate of a substantial number of white
applicants. It is unremarkable because it is obvious, on a moment's re
flection, that the highly competitive nature of selective admissions
means that many applicants, including many white applicants, will be
rejected for reasons having nothing to do with race. White applicants
like Ashley Davis, whose academic qualifications simply are not com
petitive regardless of race, have no standing to challenge affirmative
action even on an equal-footing theory.
In contrast to Davis, Craig Green had an academic index score that
was high enough to keep him from being rejected at the first stage of
the university's admissions process, but not high enough for automatic
admission. In the second stage, his application undeniably received
less favorable treatment on the basis of his race. Had he not been
white, his TSI score would have been 4.39 instead of 3.89, reflecting
the 0.5-point credit for being nonwhite. Even a TSI score of 4.39, how
ever, would not have satisfied the 4.40 threshold for second-stage ad
mission. Green's application would have proceeded to the third stage
of review regardless of his race, and in that stage, both edge readers
gave him the lowest possible score on the basis of race-neutral criteria.
In short, Green's application would have met the same outcome had
he been white or nonwhite. Moreover, given his low score in the edge
read, it is highly improbable that he would have gained one of the
seats that would have been available absent the use of race in the sec
ond stage.
Does Green, whose application was subject to race-conscious re
view, stand in a better position to challenge the admissions policy than
Davis? The district court thought not, concluding that "Green simply
cannot show he was otherwise qualified to compete for admission
equally with minority applicants."164 "Every non-white applicant ad
mitted at the TSI phase possessed a TSI score higher than Green's
even before the addition of any ethnic/racial bonus points," the court
observed,165 and in the edge read, the university's "final decision to
reject his application was not based on race. "166 But the Eleventh
Circuit reversed on the ground that Green, unlike Davis, "has actually
been exposed to unequal treatment."167 According to the court of ap
peals, "the direct exposure to unequal treatment" is a cognizable
injury-in-fact for purposes of standing.168
164. Tracy v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. CV 497-45, 2000 WL 1123268, at
*11 (S.D. Ga. June 16, 2000).
165. Tracy v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1320 (S.D. Ga.
1999).
166. Id. at 1318.
167. Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1279 (11th Cir.
2001).
168. Id. at 1280.
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Green's case is not as clear-cut as Davis's, as the disagreement be
tween the district court and the court of appeals suggests. Because his
application reached the race-conscious TSI stage, it is not literally true
that race played no role in his case. But to deny Davis standing while
granting it to Green, as the Eleventh Circuit did, appears to elevate
form over substance. For Green's case can be made identical to
Davis's simply by bifurcating the TSI stage into two substages, the first
race-neutral and the second race-conscious. In the race-neutral sub
stage, the university would assign each applicant a TSI score account
ing only for nonracial factors. It would then admit all applicants with a
TSI score of at least 4.40, while sending all applicants with a TSI score
from 3.79 to 3.89 to the edge read, whether white or nonwhite. In the
race-conscious sub-stage, the university would adjust the remaining
applicants' TSI scores to account for race. It would then admit appli
cants at 4.40 and above, reject applicants below 3.79, and send the rest
to the edge read. Under this functionally equivalent process, Green's
application would have passed directly from the first sub-stage to the
edge read - where it would have been rejected - without ever hav
ing been exposed to unequal treatment based on race. In the context
of Bowen and Bok's study, Green would join Davis among the ranks
of white applicants who would not have been admitted even if their
odds had been as favorable as the odds facing black applicants.
Green's example thus suggests an important distinction between
"the inability to compete on an equal footing," which has been recog
nized by the Supreme Court as a cognizable injury in fact, and mere
"exposure to unequal treatment," which has not. An equal-footing
claim presumes that the white applicant is actually "able and ready" to
compete on an equal footing with minority applicants, were it not for
the university's consideration of race.169 To qualify as "able and
ready," a white applicant need not show that he would have been ad
mitted under a race-neutral selection process. But at a minimum, he
must show that he would have gained admission had he competed on
an equal footing with minority applicants under the race-conscious
process being challenged. A white applicant who cannot make that
showing - who would have been rejected even if accorded the same
preference given to minority applicants
cannot plausibly assert that,
were it not for his race, he would have been "able and ready" to com
pete equally with minority applicants. That applicant should lack
standing.
To be sure, the bare fact of exposure to unequal treatment on the
basis of race is not inherently unactionable. Exposure alone is some-

169. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508
U.S. 656, 666 (1993).
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times capable of inflicting expressive or stigmatic harm.170 But Green,
predictably, has not alleged any non-instrumental harm. He does not
contend that his exposure to unequal treatment at the TSI stage stig
matized him based on his race. Nor does he suggest that the admis
sions policy expressed contempt or racial prejudice toward him, or
that it otherwise conveyed a message of racial inferiority or subordina
tion.171 I shall have more to say later about non-instrumental harm,172
but for now it is enough to observe that it is far from clear how the
university's consideration of race injured Green in a "concrete and
particularized" way, any more than it injured Ashley Davis.173 Green,
like Davis, sued the university because he believed he was unfairly de
nied admission on the basis of his race. Yet his claim lacks any viable
factual predicate. The Eleventh Circuit's view that Green's exposure
to unequal treatment, without more, somehow tainted the university's
decision to reject his application conceives of an injury to Green that
is prohibitively abstract.174 If this is correct, then the class of white ap
plicants without standing to challenge affirmative action includes not
only applicants like Davis for whom race played literally no role in the
process of selection, but also applicants like Green for whom race
played no role in the result.

Category 2: Kirby Tracy
Of course, each year many unsuccessful white applicants, unlike
Green, would have been admitted had they been nonwhite. The third
Georgia plaintiff, Kirby Tracy, is such an applicant. The record in
Tracy's case is clear on two points. In the year he applied, he would
have been admitted had he been black.175 Nevertheless, he would not
170. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (stating that an official policy
of "separate but equal" inflicts on members of a disfavored race "a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to
be undone").
171. It seems implausible, in my view, to argue that programs designed to benefit mem
bers of historically disadvantaged groups actually express negative judgments about the
moral worth and capacities of members of historically advantaged groups. With respect to
intangible injury, Green is simply not in the same position as a black student exposed to
unequal treatment against the historical backdrop of Jim Crow. But cf. Adarand Construc
tors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) ("In my mind, government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign
prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice.").
172. See infra notes 213-228 and accompanying text.
173. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that plaintiff must
have suffered a "concrete and particularized" injury in order to have constitutional stand
ing).
174. See id. ; City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) ("Abstract injury is
not enough [for constitutional standing].").
175. See Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir.
2001).
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have been admitted even if the university had not used racial prefer
ences in its admissions process.176 Under settled law, Tracy has stand
ing to oppose the 1995 admissions policy on an equal-footing theory,
regardless of whether he would have won admission under a race
neutral selection process.177 Applicants like Tracy are thus positioned
to challenge the merits of affirmative action without relying on the il
logic of the causation fallacy. Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court ex
plained in its most recent encounter with affirmative action in univer
sity admissions, Texas v. Lesage,178 the issue of causation remains
important as a potential limitation on the range of legal claims avail
able even to such applicants.
Lesage involved the use of racial preferences by a University of
Texas doctoral program. Fran�ois Lesage, a white African immigrant,
was one of 223 applicants to the Ph.D. program in 1996. The school
rejected Lesage but offered admission to "roughly 20 candidates," in
cluding "at least one minority candidate."179 Lesage asserted various
claims against the school, including a § 1983 claim for damages arising
from the school's rejection of his application. In district court, the
school won summary judgment by establishing beyond dispute that
Lesage would not have been admitted even if the admissions process
had been race-neutral.180 The Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground that
the summary judgment inquiry should have focused on " 'whether the
state violated Lesage's constitutional rights by rejecting his application
in the course of operating a racially discriminatory admissions pro
gram.' "181 According to the Fifth Circuit, an applicant rejected under
a race-conscious review process has " 'suffered an implied injury' the inability to compete on an equal footing." 182
The Supreme Court in turn reversed, explaining that "[u]nder Mt.
Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, even if the [school] has considered
an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plain
tiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would
have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration."183
176. See Tracy v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. CV 497-45, 2000 WL 1 123268,
at *7, *11 (S.D. Ga. June 16, 2000).
177. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 2 1 1 (1995); Northeastern Fla.
Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993).
178. 528 U.S. 18 (1999) (per curiam).
179. Id. at 19.
180. See id. at 19-20. It was undisputed that "[a]t least 80 applicants had higher under
graduate grade point averages (GPA's) than Lesage, 152 applicants had higher Graduate
Record Examination (GRE) scores, and 73 applicants had both higher GPA's and higher
GRE scores." Id. at 19. Moreover, neither Lesage's personal statement nor his letters of rec
ommendation strengthened his application. See id.
181. Id. at W (quoting Lesage v. Texas, 158 F.3d 213, 222 (5th Cir. 1998)).
182. Id. (quoting Lesage, 158 F.3d at 222).
183. Id. at 20-21 (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)).
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In Mt. Healthy, a teacher named Fred Doyle alleged that the school
had unlawfully terminated him in retaliation for disclosing an internal
memorandum to a local radio station.184 In refusing to renew Doyle's
contract, the school cited unprofessional conduct that included not
only his disclosure of the memo, but also an incident in which he made
obscene gestures to students in the school cafeteria.185 While agreeing
with Doyle that the radio station incident involved constitutionally
protected speech,186 the Court held that the school's action, even if
substantially motivated by Doyle's protected conduct, "would [not]
necessarily amount to a constitutional violation justifying remedial ac
tion. "187 The Court observed that it is "necessary to formulate a test of
causation which distinguishes between a result caused by a constitu
tional violation and one not so caused" for purposes of determining
liability in certain areas of constitutional law.188 Although the school
"considered constitutionally protected conduct in deciding not to rehire
Doyle," it was not "precluded . . . from attempting,to prove to a trier of
fact that quite apart from such conduct Doyle's record was such that he
would not have been rehired in any event."189 "A borderline or mar
ginal candidate," the Court said, "ought not to be able, by engaging in
[protected] conduct, to prevent his employer from assessing his per
formance record and reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of
that record."190
Lesage extended Mt. Healthy's "test of causation" to the equal pro
tection context.191 The Court unanimously held that "where a plaintiff
challenges a discrete governmental decision as being based on an im
permissible criterion and it is undisputed that the government would
have made the same decision regardless, there is no cognizable injury
warranting relief under § 1983."192 While stating that a causation de
fense has no applicability where "a plaintiff . . . challenges an ongoing
184. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282-84.
185. Id. at 282-83 & n.1. Doyle's record also included an argument with another teacher
resulting in a suspension that was later rescinded, an argument with school cafeteria employ
ees over the amount of spaghetti he had been served, and an incident in which he referred to
students, in connection with a disciplinary complaint, as "sons of bitches." Id. at 281-82.
186. Id. at 284.
187. Id. at 285.
188. Id. at 286. The Court observed that the "test of causation" had been applied in
cases involving due process challenges to allegedly involuntary confessions. Id.
1 89. Id. at 286.
190. Id.
191. Recognizing that "previous decisions on this point have typically involved alleged
retaliation for protected First Amendment activity rather than racial discrimination," the
Court said "that distinction is immaterial. The underlying principle is the same: The gov
ernment can avoid liability by proving that it would have made the same decision without
the impermissible motive." Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999) (per curiam).
192. Id.
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race-conscious program and seeks forward-looking relief," the Court
made clear that "where there is no allegation of an ongoing or immi
nent constitutional violation to support a claim for forward-looking
relief, the government's conclusive demonstration that it would have
made the same decision absent the alleged discrimination precludes
any finding of liability."193
Taken at face value, Lesage means that a white plaintiff like Tracy,
for whom a defendant institution can make a same-decision showing,
has no viable § 1983 claim. The Court regarded a same-decision
showing as a complete defense to § 1983 liability, not merely as a de
fense to certain remedies. Tracy's best recourse, Lesage suggests, is to
challenge the admissions policy through a claim for "forward-looking
relief," supported by an "allegation of an ongoing or imminent consti
tutional violation."194 To maintain such a claim, Tracy "need not af
firmatively establish that he would receive the benefit in question if
race were not considered. "195 Lesage thus circumscribes the range of
substantive claims available to white applicants who seek to challenge
affirmative action. Even a plaintiff properly positioned to assert an
equal-footing claim cannot succeed under § 1983 if the defendant uni
versity is able to expose the causation fallacy with respect to that
plaintiff. L esage is not framed as a case about standing, but the rule it
announces seems functionally equivalent to a holding that a same
decision showing defeats the standing of a white applicant seeking to
use § 1 983 to challenge affirmative action.196
Although Lesage and its implications appear straightforward, the
decision is susceptible to some doubt. The holding appears to be a
rather awkward solution for the Court's stated goal of preventing a
§ 1 983 plaintiff from achieving an outcome that would not have re193. Id.
194. Id. Although Lesage leaves open this possibility for white applicants in Tracy's po
sition, Tracy himself is unable to take advantage of it. After he was rejected by the
University of Georgia, Tracy enrolled at another college. See Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001). Two years later, he won admission to
the University of Georgia as a transfer student and remained a student there during the liti
gation. Id. Under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983), a plaintiff seeking
prospective injunctive relief must allege a "real and immediate" threat of future injury aris
ing from unlawful conduct. The Eleventh Circuit determined that, under Lyons, Tracy lacks
standing to seek forward-looking relief. Finding "no evidence that he intends to reapply for
admission to UGA under any version of the freshman admissions policy," the court of ap
peals concluded that "[t)here is no likelihood . . . that he will ever again be exposed to
UGA's allegedly discriminatory freshman admissions process." Wooden, 247 F.3d at 128485.
195. Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1286 (quoting Lesage, 528 U.S. at 21).
196. The district court in the Georgia litigation read Lesage as "enunciat[ing) a standing
requirement." Tracy v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. CV 497-45, 2000 WL
1123268, at *9 (S.D. Ga. June 16, 2001). But the Eleventh Circuit maintained that a same
decision showing under Lesage goes to the merits of a § 1983 claim, not to standing. See
Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1280.
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suited in the absence of the defendant's allegedly unconstitutional
conduct.197 As some commentators have argued, a same-decision
showing should be understood as bearing on the issue of remedy, not
liability.198 After all, the fact that Tracy would have been rejected had
he competed in a race-neutral process does not mean that he would
have been rejected had he competed on an equal footing with black
applicants in the race-conscious process being challenged. Indeed,
Lesage recognized that the denial of admission is an injury distinct
from the denial of opportunity to compete on an equal footing.199 A
same-decision showing negates the first type of injury, but not the sec
ond.
It thus seems incorrect to say that a § 1983 plaintiff who asserts a
valid equal-footing claim has suffered "no cognizable injury warrant
ing relief" if it is shown that he would not have been admitted absent
racial preferences.200 Even if Tracy is not entitled to an order of admis
sion or actual damages resulting from his denial of admission, he is at
least entitled to nominal damages if he prevails on the merits of his
equal-footing claim.201 The law should not make a § 1983 plaintiff bet
ter off than he would have been absent the alleged constitutional vio
lation, but it also should not make the plaintiff worse off. Yet that is
what results when a § 1983 plaintiff who establishes that "the govern
ment has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision
adverse to [him]"202 is foreclosed from obtaining nominal damages in
recognition of the violation.
Such a result is in substantial tension with the Supreme Court's
holding in Carey v. Piphus that a § 1983 plaintiff who has shown a pro
cedural due process violation but no consequential harm may recover
nominal damages to vindicate the constitutional right.203 Lesage, a per
197. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977) (describing
the policy objectives underlying the Court's holding).
198. See, e.g., Sheldon Nahmod, Mt. Healthy and Causation-in-Fact: The Court Still
Doesn't Get It!, 51 MERCER L. REV. 603, 610-17 (2000); Christina B. Whitman, An Essay on
Texas v. Lesage, 51 MERCER L. REV. 621, 632-34 (2000).
199. See Lesage, 528 U.S. at 21-22.
200. Id. at 21.
201. Observing that Lesage was limited to § 1983, the district court held that Tracy had
succeeded in showing that the university's admissions process violated Title VI and that he
was entitled to nominal damages under Title VI. See Tracy, 2000 WL 1 123268, at *11-*12.
202. Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20.
203. See 435 U.S. 247, 248 (1978). The tension between Lesage and Carey has been
noted elsewhere. See Tracy, 2000 WL 1123268, at *9-*10; Nahmod, supra note 198, at 611-12;
Whitman, supra note 198, at 632-34. Carey was a procedural due process case involving the
suspension of two high school students without an adjudicatory hearing. The Court held that
while substantial damages under § 1983 for a deprivation of procedural due process must be
proven and may not be presumed, see Carey, 435 U.S. at 262-65, "the denial of procedural
due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury," id. at
266 (citations omitted). "Even if respondents' suspensions were justified, and even if they did
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curiam opinion issued without briefing or oral argument, did not men
tion Carey, nor did it address the issue of nominal damages.204 It is
possible that Lesage reflects a silent effort by the Court to cabin Carey
and thereby reduce incentives for civil rights litigation.205 But given the
special solicitude that the current Court has shown toward the claims
of white plaintiffs challenging affirmative action, it would not be sµr
prising to see Lesage modified or limited in a future case brought by a
§ 1983 plaintiff who seeks nominal damages on an equal-footing claim.

Category 3: Allan Bakke?
Finally, the cases of Davis, Green, and Tracy are as noteworthy for
the narratives they reveal as for the one they do not. In every process
of selective admissions that uses racial preferences, there is a small
group of white applicants who not only would have been admitted had
they been nonwhite, but also would have been admitted had the proc
ess been completely race-neutral. These are the applicants who ac
count for the marginal effect of affirmative action on the odds of ad
mission facing the pool of white applicants taken as a whole. Such
applicants, of course, are in the strongest position to challenge af
firmative action; they are legitimate purveyors of the Bakke narrative.
With respect to this group, there can be no doubt that racial prefer
ences present very serious problems of fairness.
It is important to note, however, that the absence of an example
from this group in the Davis-Green-Tracy litigation is not an accident.
In the current round of legal challenges to affirmative action, one
searches in vain for examples of plaintiffs who convincingly fit the
Bakke paradigm.206 The reason appears to be two-fold. First, such apnot suffer any other actual injury," the Court explained, "the fact remains that they were de
prived of their right to procedural due process." Id. "By making the deprivation of such rights
actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the impor
tance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed; but at the same time, it
remains true to the principle that substantial damages should be awarded only to compensate
actual injury." Id.
204. Cf. Lesage, 528 U.S. at 19 ("Lesage filed suit seeking money damages and injunc
tive relief." (emphasis added)).
205. Lesage is broadly consistent with other recent decisions reducing incentives for civil
rights litigation. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Va. Dep't of Health &
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603-04 (2001) (limiting "prevailing party" entitled to attorneys'
fees under various civil rights statutes to a party who has secured a judgment on the merits
or a court-ordered consent decree); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) (stating that
for a § 1983 plaintiff who wins nominal damages but no compensatory damages, "the only
reasonable (attorneys'] fee is usually no fee at all").
206. We have already seen that Davis, Green, Tracy, and Bakke do not fit the mold.
Similarly, in Lesage, all evidence indicated that the plaintiff would not have been admitted to
the University of Texas doctoral program even if the school's admissions process had been
colorblind. See 528 U.S. at 19-20 (quoting the district court's conclusion that "any considera
tion of race had no effect on this particular individual's rejection"); see also supra note 180.
In DeFunis v. Odegaard, the rejected white plaintiff, Marco DeFunis, was among the bottom
thirty-three applicants on a waiting list consisting of 155 applicants for a first-year law school
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plicants are statistically quite rare. The number of white applicants
displaced by minority applicants who may be said to have benefited
from affirmative action - i.e., who are admitted in the margin be
tween a hypothetical race-neutral admission rate and the actual mi
nority admission rate - is extraordinarily small compared to the total
number of white applicants who fail to gain admission. Using the
yield-adjusted race-neutral admission rates in Table 2, we can calcu
late the total number of white applicants in Bowen and Bok's study
who would have been admitted in the absence of racial preferences.207
If we were to subtract from that total the number of white applicants
who actually were admitted in Bowen and Bok's study, we would find
that the difference represents only 1.5% of the white applicants who
class with an enrollment limit of 150. See 507 P.2d 1 169, 1 176 (Wash. 1973), dismissed as
moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). Ultimately, the school removed DeFunis from the waiting list and
rejected him. At that time, "275 students were admitted," and "55 students remained on the
waiting list." 507 P.2d at 1 176; see id. (twenty-nine applicants with a higher academic ranking
than DeFunis were denied admission). In Hopwood, through an evidentiary analysis de
scribed by the Fifth Circuit as "painstakingly thorough" and "eminently correct," Hopwood
v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 272 (5th Cir. 2000), the district court determined that none of the four
plaintiffs would have been admitted to the University of Texas Law School had the admis
sions process been race neutral. See Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872, 893-901 (W.D.
Tex. 1998). The available records of the University of Washington and University of
Michigan lawsuits do not contain any findings on this issue.
I am aware of only one reported case (other than Bakke) where a federal court has
found that a white plaintiff would have been admitted in the absence of racial preferences.
See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1376-77 (S.D. Ga.
2000), affd, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001) (invalidating the University of Georgia's admis
sions policy). Yet in that case, the finding is far from convincing. There, after observing that
under Lesage the university could avoid liability if it could make a same-decision showing,
the district court determined that the university failed to carry its burden of proving that two
plaintiffs, Aimee Bogrow and Molly Ann Beckenhauer, would not have been admitted even
under a race-neutral system. Based on the published opinion, however, it appears that the
university did not make any attempt to meet its evidentiary burden. The opinion reviews and
rejects statistical evidence offered by intervenors in the case, but nowhere does it suggest
that the university offered any evidence of its own. Tellingly, the district court observed:
The evidentiary showing Mt. Healthy requires, incidentally, is not difficult to understand.
UGA could have made a same-decision showing by demonstrating, for example, that: (a)
1000 applicants were denied admission at the TSI stage; and (b) after re-ranking all the TSI
stage applicants (applying all but the race and gender TSI factors), the plaintiffs ranked
among the bottom 1,000 applicants. But it has not done this . . . .
Id. at 1377. Beckenhauer, it should be noted, would have been rejected even if she had re
ceived the 0.5-point credit given to minority applicants. See id. at 1365-66 (TSI cut-off for
proceeding to the edge read was 4.66; Beckenhauer's TSI was 4.06). She thus stands in the
same position as Ashley Davis and Craig Green. Bogrow was a stronger applicant; like Kirby
Tracy, she would have been admitted had she been a minority applicant. See id. (Bogrow's
TSI was 4.52; applicants above 4.92 were automatically admitted). But that fact, as Tracy's
example shows, does not mean Bogrow would have been admitted under a race-neutral pro
cess.

207. Yield-adjusted race-neutral admission rates appear in Table 2 as well as line 10 of
Table B of the Appendix. Line 4 of Table A of the Appendix gives the number of white ap
plicants within each SAT interval. The number of white applicants who would have been
admitted under yield-adjusted race-neutral admission rates is (.067)(1062) + (.117)(593) +
(.155)(939) + (.162)(1507) + (.209)(2075) + (.206)(2816) + (.238)(3384) + (.254)(3878) +
(.308)(3532) + (.398)(2766) + (.508)(1507) + (.627)(642) 6,701 .
=

1094

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:1045

actually were rejected.208 The dearth of bona fide Bakke plaintiffs thus
directly reflects the dearth of such applicants. Bakke himself, we have
learned, did not provide a genuine example.
At any given institution, moreover, a further consideration tends
to lessen the likelihood that an applicant with a legitimate complaint
of displacement will go to court. A white applicant who seeks admis
sion to a particular school, but is displaced by affirmative action, is
necessarily one who has come very close to being admitted. If an ap
plicant of that caliber were to apply to several comparable schools, it
seems improbable that she would be rejected in every instance. An
applicant who is truly close to the cusp of admission at one institution
will more than likely fall on the other side of the cusp at one of the
other institutions to which she applied. Such an applicant makes an
unlikely plaintiff. If, for example, a white student applies to ten selec
tive schools and, though rated highly at each school, is rejected by all
but one or two, the applicant may have legitimate grounds for com
plaining that she was displaced as a result of affirmative action. But
because she has gained admission to one or two schools of comparable
quality, her incentive (and, I suspect, psychological urge) to file a law
suit is considerably attenuated. In this regard, it is interesting to note
that in 1973, Allan Bakke failed to gain admission not only to the
Davis Medical School, but also to ten other medical schools to which
he applied.209 Bakke, like most white applicants and plaintiffs, was not
close to the cusp.
C.

Summary

Not all unsuccessful white applicants are similarly situated with re
spect to the impact of racial preferences in selective admissions. From
the Georgia examples, three distinct categories emerge. Category 1
consists of white applicants who neither would have been admitted
had there been no racial preferences nor would have been admitted
had they been nonwhite. This category includes not only applicants
like Ashley Davis, whose application was denied on the basis of
wholly race-neutral criteria, but also applicants like Craig Green,
whose application was exposed to unequal treatment but ultimately
denied on race-neutral grounds. Category 1 applicants are not rare; in
Bowen and Bok's study, they account for nearly half of all rejected
208. We observed previously that 6433 white applicants were actually admitted and that
18,267 white applicants were actually rejected. See supra note 163. Thus, eliminating racial
preferences would have increased the number of admitted white applicants by 268 (6701 mi
nus 6433), which amounts to 1.5% of rejected white applicants.
209. See Amici National Urban League, supra note 32, at 12 n.6 (observing that Bakke
was rejected by Bowman-Gray, University of South Dakota, University of Cincinnati,
Wayne State University, Georgetown University, Mayo, UCLA, San Francisco, Stanford
and University of Minnesota).
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white applicants. Category 2 consists of white applicants who would
not have been admitted had there been no racial preferences but, un
like Davis and Green, would have been admitted had they been non
white. Kirby Tracy falls into Category 2, and these applicants also
compose slightly less than half of the unsuccessful white applicants in
Bowen and Bok's sample. Finally, Category 3 consists of white appli
cants who not only would have been admitted had they been nonwhite
but also, unlike Tracy, would have been admitted had there been no
racial preferences. The conventional yet erroneous view is that Allan
Bakke belongs to this group, which accounts for less than 2% of the
rejected white applicants in Bowen and Bok's study.210
Notably, this typology is not contingent on the particular charac
teristics of the Georgia admissions process. If a selective institution at
tracts far more white applicants than available seats, and if it admits
far more white applicants than minority applicants, then the white ap
plicants it rejects may be grouped into the categories described above,
however the institution chooses to structure its use of race in admis
sions. Moreover, what is important in this breakdown is not the abso
lute precision of the percentages; one might expect the numbers to
vary somewhat from institution to institution. What is important,
rather, is a feel for relative magnitudes. The story of Allan Bakke,
however compelling it may be in public discourse on affirmative ac
tion, captures only the tiniest sliver of the real impact of racial prefer
ences on white applicants.
Altogether absent from the Bakke narrative are the Category 1
stories of Ashley Davis, Craig Green, and the large percentage of re
jected white applicants whose failure to gain admission cannot be at
tributed in any way to their race. The size of this group is a powerful
testament to the sheer statistical realities of selective admissions: So
steep are the odds that not only do the vast majority of unsuccessful
white applicants have no plausible claim that they were displaced by
minority admittees, but a substantial number (close to half) have no
plausible claim that race had anything to do with their rejection. The
undue prominence of the Category 3 narrative directly reflects the in
visibility of Category 1 applicants in the affirmative action debate.
Category 3's exaggerated significance is also attributable in part to
the linguistic elision of Category 2 claims with Category 3 claims. Both
categories of applicants may properly claim they were denied admis
sion "because of race." Indeed, both have standing to challenge af210. Theoretically, there is a fourth category consisting of white applicants who would
not have been admitted had they been nonwhite but would have been admitted had there
been no racial preferences. Given the substantial variation in admissions processes, I cannot
say with total certainty that no white applicants fall into such a category. But because all evi
dence suggests that it is far more difficult for a rejected white applicant to have gained ad
mission in the absence of racial preferences than with the benefit of a racial preference, it
seems safe to assume the fourth category is a null set.
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firmative action. It is not always true, however, that a white applicant
who would have been admitted had she been able to benefit from a
racial preference also would have been admitted had the admissions
process employed no racial preferences at all. In fact, the vast majority
of such applicants would have been rejected even under a race-neutral
process. The conventional narrative, in addition to omitting Category
1, makes no effort to distinguish between Category 2 and Category 3.
As a consequence, the narrative captures none of the most typical ef
fects of affirmative action on white applicants, even as it portrays the
truly exceptional case as the rule.
IV.

RESHAPING THE DEBATE

At the outset, I stated that my intention in this Article was not to
resolve the ultimate fairness or constitutionality of affirmative action.
The causation fallacy gives rise to a distorted understanding of how
affirmative action affects white applicants. But exposing its illogic does
not abolish the standing of every white plaintiff, nor does it refute
every legal claim a proper plaintiff might assert. If it is true, as I sus
pect, that white applicants in Category 3 make unlikely plaintiffs, and
if courts continue to deny standing to Category 1 applicants, then the
constitutionality of affirmative action will likely be settled in a case
brought by an applicant in Category 2. Such an applicant will resemble
Allan Bakke: strong enough to gain admission had he been a minority
applicant, but not strong enough to gain admission had there been no
racial preferences. Under current law, as long as the plaintiff seeks
prospective relief, dispelling the causation fallacy will not settle the
merits of his case.211
Nevertheless, recognizing the causation fallacy is important to
evaluating the constitutional merits of affirmative action to the extent
that it narrows and focuses the nature of the burden affirmative action
imposes on white applicants. The application of strict scrutiny, while
doctrinally elaborate, inevitably tends to reflect some fundamental
understanding and balancing of the burdens and benefits associated
with the challenged policy. As Justice Marshall observed three dec
ades ago, the degree of rigor actually exercised by a court in scruti
nizing a particular classification typically depends on "the character of
the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in
the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they
do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classi
fication."212 The second factor, which inquires into the nature and se211. See supra notes 194-195 and accompanying text (discussing Texas
U.S. 18 (1999)).

v.

Lesage, 528

212. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 , 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dis
senting) (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting));
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verity of the deprivation caused by the classification, finds expression
in modem narrow tailoring analysis. Although the Supreme Court has
not defined precisely what narrow tailoring demands in the context of
race-conscious admissions, the impact of affirmative action on white
applicants will be a relevant factor.213 A proper characterization of that
impact is therefore essential to assessing the legal merits of affirmative
action.
By clarifying that displacement is not the most widespread harm
suffered by white applicants, dispelling the causation fallacy has the
important consequence of forcing a closer examination of exactly how
affirmative action harms white applicants, especially those in Category
2, the applicants most likely to become litigants. Category 2 applicants
are plainly disadvantaged by their ineligibility for a racial preference;
had they been evaluated on an equal footing with minority applicants,
they would have been admitted. When Category 2 applicants go to
court, however, what they seek is not an admissions process that enti
tles them to a preference on par with the preference given to minority
applicants. What they seek, rather, is a process that employs no racial
preferences at all. Yet under such a process, Category 2 applicants
would meet the same fate as they would under a race-conscious proc
ess: They would be rejected. Thus, no coherent relation between the
type of unfairness complained of and the type of fairness sought can
be forged from a consideration of tangible harm. The desired remedy,
while greatly reducing the number of minority admittees and replacing
them with white applicants in Category 3, would not alter any out
comes for white applicants in Category 2.
Ultimately, for Category 2 applicants, the complaint of unequal
treatment must hinge on some form of intangible injury. As I stated
earlier, the notion that affirmative action expresses racial prejudice
against white applicants is, in my view, a nonstarter,214 and I know of
no reported case in which a white plaintiff has relied on such a theory.
Separate from that notion, however, is the concern that an admissions
process that uses racial preferences as a means of enhancing educa
tional diversity runs the risk of stereotyping white applicants. Racial
see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("There is only one
Equal Protection Clause . . . I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the
two-tiered analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical method
of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain decisions that
actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion.").
.

213. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (plurality opinion) (narrow
tailoring depends in part on "the impact of the [race-conscious action] on the rights of third
parties"); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 281-83 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(evaluating burden on innocent parties imposed by race-based hiring goals as part of narrow
tailoring inquiry); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd. 195 F.3d 698, 707 (4th Cir. 1999) (con
sidering "the burden of the Policy on innocent third parties" in evaluating whether a local
school district's race-conscious admissions policy was narrowly tailored).
214. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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stereotyping afflicts white applicants when a university's admissions
process, in pursuing educational diversity, expresses illegitimate as
sumptions about the viewpoints and experiences of white applicants in
relation to their minority counterparts. In other words, membership in
a minority racial group may not be used as the sole or primary means
for classifying applicants into those who are able and those who are
unable to contribute to educational diversity.
The Eleventh Circuit's recent opinion striking down the University
of Georgia's admissions policy invoked precisely this line of reasoning
in defining the harm suffered by white applicants.215 An admissions
policy premised on educational diversity, the Eleventh Circuit said,
may not take race into account while "permit[ting] no favorable
treatment of [white] applicants whose personal backgrounds or
skills . . . undeniably promot[e] diversity."216 Depending on the institu
tion and its mission, such applicants may include
[i]ndividuals who come from economically disadvantaged homes; indi
viduals who have lived or traveled widely abroad; individuals from re
mote or rural areas; individuals who speak foreign languages; individuals
with unique communications skills (such as an ability to read Braille or
communicate with the deaf); and individuals who have overcome per
sonal adversity or social hardship.217

The point is that "when a university, in the name of student body di
versity, grants preferential treatment to some applicants based on
race, it must ensure that applicants are fully and fairly examined as in
dividuals for their potential contributions beyond race to diversity."218
A university that fails to do so "unfairly burden[s] 'innocent' third par
ties - specifically, white applicants, or more particularly, white appli
cants who may have greater potential to enhance student body diver
sity" than minority applicants.219
215. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001). Con
spicuously, and to its credit, the Eleventh Circuit nowhere identified displacement as a harm
to white applicants, even though the district court had ordered the admission of two of the
three plaintiffs on the ground that the university failed to prove they would not have been
admitted in the absence of affirmative action. But cf supra note 206 (discussing weakness of
district court's determination).
216. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1255.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1257.
219. Id. at 1260. The Eleventh Circuit determined that the University of Georgia's ad
missions policy failed in this regard on two counts. First, the second stage of review (the TSI
stage), while including race as a diversity factor, did not include a sufficiently broad range of
nonracial factors to ensure that "an applicant's true potential to contribute to diversity is
ever fully and fairly assessed." Id. at 1258. "[T)o take only one example, an applicant who
has spent her summers performing volunteer work in a less developed 'third world' country
presumably would add far more diversity to the class than many of her peers who worked at
more ordinary and less challenging summer jobs, yet at the TSI stage the uniqueness of her
experience is wholly ignored." Id. at 1255. Second, the degree of preference given to non
white applicants at the TSI stage was "disproportionate to the very few [nonracial) diversity-
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In a diversity-based admissions program, the risk of improper
stereotyping is no doubt real and raises valid constitutional concerns
that have been recognized by the Supreme Court.220 Aware of the
complexity in this area,221 I am not inclined to expand this Article into
a theory of whether and when stereotyping is constitutionally permis
sible. That is a topic for another day. Here I am content to offer three
limited observations. First, the stereotyping argument, as asserted by

related factors that may permissibly be considered at that stage, and quite plainly [was] con
siderable relative to the many factors relating as much if not more directly to diversity that
the TSI formula wholly excludes." Id. at 1257. "[B)y weighing race so heavily, UGA neces
sarily discounts other non-academic factors in the TSI that may in some instances be far
more accurate barometers for diversity." Id. at 1258.
In this regard, the personal stories of well-known white plaintiffs like Jennifer Gratz and
Cheryl Hopwood have particular salience. Gratz, a good student with many extracurricular
involvements, came from a working-class home where neither parent had finished college.
See Cohen, supra note 9. Hopwood, the mother of a severely disabled child, applied to law
school at age twenty-eight after working all through high school and then putting herself
through community college and a four-year bachelor's program at a non-selective state
school. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 946 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Her circumstance would
bring a different perspective to the law school."); Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872, 903
(W.D. Tex. 1998); Richard Bernstein, Racial Discrimination or Righting Past Wrongs?, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 1994, at BS ("Ms. Hopwood's father died when she was a girl and she was
reared under difficult circumstances by her mother."). Both Gratz and Hopwood had solid
academic credentials (indeed, many applicants with similar credentials were admitted in the
years they applied), and both overcame disadvantages. But elite schools traditionally have
not sought out applicants with the social, educational, or economic profile of Gratz's family
or Hopwood's. See Pricing the Poor Out of College, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2002, at A22 (criti
cizing "a national system that is directing more and more its resources at middle- and upper
income students"). It is worth questioning whether white applicants like Gratz and
Hopwood, instead of attacking affirmative action, might do better to urge top schools com
mitted to genuine educational diversity to place a higher premium on first-generation college
attendance or growing up in a blue-collar home. See id. (finding Mount Holyoke and Smith
Colleges noteworthy because they "have historically taken it upon themselves to seek out
first-generation college students as well as women who are returning to school after mother
hood or careers"); cf Sturm & Guinier, supra note 75, at 992 ("Cheryl Hopwood . . . do[es]
not see the class-based connection between [her] own exclusion and that of the beneficiaries
of affirmative action.").
220. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) ("[Racial gerrymandering] reinforces
the perception that members of the same racial group - regardless of their age, education,
economic status, or the community in which they live - think alike, share the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions
elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes."); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59
(1992) ("This Court firmly has rejected the view that assumptions of partiality based on race
provide a legitimate basis for disqualifying a person as an impartial juror. . . . We therefore
reaffirm today that the exercise of a peremptory challenge must not be based on either the
race of the juror or the racial stereotypes held by the party.").
221. For commentary examining racial stereotyping in other legal contexts, including
law enforcement, broadcast licensing, jury selection, and voting rights, see, for example,
Leonard M. Baynes, Paradoxes of Racial Stereotypes, Diversity and Past Discrimination in
Establishing Affirmative Action in FCC Broadcast Licensing, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 979 (2000) ;
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jura/ Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community Repre
sentation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353 (1999); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting
Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201 (1996); and David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by
Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 296 (2001).
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white applicants, is separate and distinct from the concern that af
firmative action stereotypes minority applicants. Affirmative action, it
has long been argued, imposes a damaging stigma of inferiority on all
minority students, whether or not they have actually benefited from
affirmative action. Moreover, when implemented to promote educa
tional diversity, racial preferences may generate an expectation that
minority students will represent a particular "minority perspective"
both inside and outside the classroom. These concerns are legitimate,
and in my view the assumption of inferiority fostered by racial prefer
ences may well be the most powerful objection to affirmative action.222
My point here, however, is that such stereotyping concerns are not
ones that white plaintiffs have any standing to raise. Indeed, the per
son best positioned to raise these issues is a minority student who
would have been admitted, or was in fact admitted, without any bene
fit from affirmative action. Yet minority students who have intervened
in the current wave of lawsuits have not gone to court in order to raise
stereotyping concerns. Instead, they have sought to preserve affirma
tive action policies by supplementing diversity rationales with reme
dial rationales.223 It would thus be ironic - and not a little disingenu
ous - for a white plaintiff challenging affirmative action to prevail on
the ground that racial preferences hurt minority students.
Second, the claim that affirmative action improperly stereotypes
white applicants is also distinct from the claim that race is altogether
irrelevant to educational diversity. The latter claim appears most
starkly in Hopwood, where the Fifth Circuit declared that the consid
eration of race in choosing students "is no more rational on its own
terms than would be choices based upon the physical size or blood
type of applicants. "224 Yet in the context of educational diversity, the
notion that race is an arbitrary attribute, on par with "physical size or
blood type," seems difficult to square with reality.225 Children of dif
ferent races grow up with different social and cultural experiences, and
"these differences of experience in turn shape attitudes, producing
characteristically different beliefs and judgments about society as a
whole, and contrasting impressions of the relation" among various
races.226 Moreover, racial differences of experience are exacerbated by
222. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
BABY (1991); SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF
RACE IN AMERICA (1990).
223. See, e.g. , Johnson, 263 F.3d 1234, at 1264-65; Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790
(E.D. Mich. 2001).
224. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945 (5th Cir. 1996).
225. For an impressive compilation of empirical evidence demonstrating the relation
between racial diversity and educational goals, see Compelling Need, supra note 75 (con
taining expert reports in the University of Michigan litigation).
226. Kronman, supra note 14, at 879. See generally IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY
LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996).
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continuing and even worsening patterns of residential and educational
segregation.227 Indeed, there is nothing remarkable in the observation
that " [b]lacks and Hispanics - and, to varying degrees, other ethnic
minorities as well - have an experience of life different from that of
their white counterparts and as a result form different judgments about
the organization of American society and the integrity and fairness of its
basic institutions,'' such as the police, courts, schools, banks, and private
businesses.228 The common-sense truth of this proposition focuses the
stereotyping argument asserted by white plaintiffs not on the wholesale
arbitrariness of race in admissions, but on the arbitrariness of taking
race into account without also taking into account other personal attrib
utes relevant to educational diversity. The argument is not that race is
an irrelevant factor, but that race is not the only relevant factor.
Finally, and most importantly, understanding the harm to white
applicants from racial preferences in terms of stereotyping as opposed
to displacement tends to frame the affirmative action debate in less
polarizing terms. The causation fallacy fundamentally conceives of af
firmative action as a policy that pits minority applicants against whites.
That conception invites courts, policymakers, and commentators to be
either "for" or "against" affirmative action: Either the ends served by
affirmative action are worthy enough to warrant the admission of mi
nority applicants at the expense of whites, or they are not. But such a
conception is accurate only for a category of white applicants who are
very few in number and not particularly prone to complain in court.
The risk of racial stereotyping affects a far greater number of white
applicants. Evaluating affirmative action against this concern has the
salutary consequence of defusing the simple opposition between mi
norities and whites, while centering the debate over racial preferences
on the facts of how a specific policy actually works when applied to
white and minority applicants. There are many ways a university might
227. See Gary Orfield & John T. Yun, Resegregation in American Schools, The Civil
Rights Project, Harvard University, at http://www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights/publications/
resegregation99.html (June 1999); Compelling Need, supra note 75.
228. Kronman, supra note 14, at 880; see also Richard Morin & Michael H. Cottman,
Discrimination's Lingering Sting: Minorities Tell of Profiling, Other Bias, WASH. POST, July
22, 2001, at Al (reporting results of national survey by Harvard University, Kaiser Founda
tion, and Washington Post comparing the frequency with which blacks, Hispanics, Asians,
and whites report experiences of discrimination, profiling, and intolerance); Richard Morin,
Misperceptions Cloud Whites' View of Blacks, WASH. POST, July 11, 2001, at Al (relating
similar national survey showing that "large numbers of white Americans incorrectly believe
that blacks are as well off as whites in terms of their jobs, incomes, schooling and health
care"). Importantly, the claim here is not that race is a proxy for other characteristics that
genuinely further the university's interest in educational diversity. For a university that seeks
educational diversity, an applicant's status as a black American is valuable insofar as grow
ing up black in America gives rise to an overall life experience that is different from growing
up white, just as growing up on a farm in Idaho produces a life experience different from
growing up on the streets of Boston. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). Blackness, of course, is not a proxy for growing up black; it is
one and the same.
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attempt to assess the potential contributions to educational diversity
of each applicant, and there are many ways a university might fail in
this regard. The key point is that the grievances of white applicants
cannot be meaningfully evaluated through a generalized balancing of
tangible costs and benefits. What is required is a nuanced examination
of how a particular affirmative action policy operates and how its op
eration does or does not accord each applicant equal dignity.
In all likelihood, this type of scrutiny would have the effect of
forcing universities to assume a greater administrative burden in de
signing and implementing their admissions processes. Individualized
review of each applicant's file would become the norm, regardless of
the volume of applicants. But the imposition of such a burden would
be well justified. It seems not too much to require a university that de
fends affirmative action on the basis of educational diversity to show
that its admissions process is genuinely designed to achieve educa
tional diversity.229 Affirmative action is not unqualifiedly good, nor is it
unqualifiedly bad. As the First Circuit observed in a recent case chal
lenging the Boston Latin School's race-conscious admissions policy,
an inquiring court cannot content itself with abstractions. . . . [W]e must
look beyond the School Committee's recital of the theoretical benefits of
diversity and inquire whether the concrete workings of the Policy merit
constitutional sanction. Only by such particularized attention can we as
certain whether the Policy bears any necessary relation to the noble ends
it espouses. In short, the devil is in the details.230

If we can agree that the details are in fact the relevant zone of inquiry
and scrutiny, then that alone would be an important step forward in
the affirmative action debate.
CONCLUSION

The basic arithmetic of selective admissions is an essential compo
nent of any conceptual framework for judging the fairness of affirma
tive action. Although Bakke paints a compelling portrait of unfairness,
it is but one part of a more complicated picture. As it turns out, it is
one small part that does not faithfully capture Bakke's own circum229. In response to the University of Georgia's contention that its high volume of applications precludes personalized review of each one, the Eleventh Circuit said:
The rejoinder to this is obvious: if UGA wants to ensure diversity through its admissions de
cisions, and wants race to be part of that calculus, then it must be prepared to shoulder the
burden of fully and fairly analyzing applicants as individuals and not merely as members of
groups when deciding their likely contribution to student body diversity.
Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001).
230. Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 797-98 (1st Cir. 1998). Citing concerns similar to
those raised by the Eleventh Circuit in Johnson, the First Circuit in Wessman invalidated the
Boston Latin School's affirmative action policy on the ground that it "focuses exclusively on
racial and ethnic diversity." Id. at 798.
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stances or the circumstances of the vast majority of unsuccessful white
applicants. Stripped of the causation fallacy, the conventional affirma
tive action narrative unravels into several narratives, each shaped by
the application of a particular admissions policy to the attributes and
qualifications of a particular applicant. Without careful attention to
the mechanics of affirmative action, it is easy to lapse into the polar
izing terms of common discourse - minorities versus whites, qualified
versus unqualified - even as those terms exaggerate the degree of ra
cial conflict in selective admissions and ignore the utter irrelevance of
race in the evaluation of large numbers of white applicants.
Justice Powell is no doubt correct that "there are serious problems
of justice connected with the idea of preference itself."231 Eventually,
when the Supreme Court revisits Bakke, it may well determine that
the problems of justice are so serious that racial preferences must end.
On the other hand, it may endorse Justice Powell's compromise, or it
may even develop an alternative. Whatever the Court decides, it will
face the task of characterizing and explaining precisely what the
problems of justice are. That explanation might begin with an ac
knowledgment that Bakke, as a story about what happens to white ap
plicants in race-conscious admissions, is more fiction than fact. For it is
only by purging the causation fallacy from our legal and moral dis
course on racial preferences that we may reach a principled conclusion
about the ultimate fairness of affirmative action.
APPENDIX
TABLE A. As discussed in Part II.B,232 one method of estimating
race-neutral admission rates is to calculate the overall percentage of
applicants (black or white) who received an offer of admission within
each SAT interval. In order to perform this calculation, we must know
the total number of applicants and the total number of admittees
within each SAT interval. Figure 2.5 of The Shape of the River com
pares the probabilities of admission by SAT interval for 1989 black
and white applicants to the five selective institutions for which Bowen
and Bok had the most detailed admissions data.233 That figure does not
show the actual numbers of white and black applicants and admittees
within each SAT interval. In response to a written request,234 however,
the Mellon Foundation informed me that in 1989 the five institutions
received a total of 24,700 applications from whites and 2200 applica
tions from blacks. The foundation also provided me with data showing
231. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 122-124.
233. The graph appears in the text accompanying note 89, supra.
234. See Personal correspondence with James L. Shulman, Financial and Administrative
Officer, Andrew W. Mellon Foundation (May 23, 2000) (on file with author).
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the percentages of white and black applicants falling within each SAT
interval. Those percentages appear in Table A, lines 1 and 3. Data
from the foundation also specify the precise values of the black and
white admission probabilities depicted in figure 2.5. Those probabili
ties appear in Table A, lines 6 and 8.
Curiously, the foundation's estimate of 2200 applications from
blacks is slightly lower than Bowen and Bok's published estimate that
the five institutions received " [m]ore than 2,300 applications" from
black applicants.235 I alerted the foundation to this discrepancy and re
quested the exact totals or, alternatively, the actual values of the nu
merators and denominators used to calculate the black and white
probabilities of admission in Figure 2.5, but the foundation denied my
request for this data.236 Faced with this ambiguity, I have estimated the
number of applications from blacks at 2400 in order to provide the
most generous assessment of the displacement effect caused by af
firmative action. Because the 2400 figure is almost surely too large,237
my calculations err on the side of overestimating the displacement ef
fect.
Using these data, it is possible to calculate the number of black and
white applicants and admittees within each SAT interval and, in turn,
the overall race-neutral rate of admission. For example, 11.4% of
white applicants and 10.2% of black applicants scored within the 12001249 interval (lines 1 and 3) This comes out to 2816 whites (11.4% of
24,700) and 245 blacks (10.2% of 2400) (lines 2 and 4), for a total of
3061 applicants in that SAT interval (line 5). Among these applicants,
19.3% of whites and 60.0% of blacks were admitted (lines 6 and 8).
This comes out to 543 white admittees (19.3% of 2816) and 147 black
admittees (60.0% of 245) (lines 7 and 9), for a total of 690 admittees
(line 10). Thus the overall rate of admission, regardless of race, is
22.5 % (690 divided by 3061) (line 11). This method of calculation pro
duces the results in Table A.

235. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 18.
236. See Personal Correspondence with James L. Shulman, Financial and Administra
tive Office, Angrew W. Mellon Foundation (July 11, 2000) (on file with author).
237. If the number had exceeded 2400, then presumably Bowen and Bok would have
said that the five institutions received "more than 2400 applications" from black applicants.
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TABLE B. Also as discussed in Part Il.B,238 the race-neutral admis
sion rates calculated in Table A do not account for the increase in
yield for black applicants likely to result from the elimination of racial
preferences. Under a race-neutral process in which black and white
applicants with comparable SAT scores are admitted at the same rate,
one would expect black admittees to accept offers of admission at the
same rate as white admittees. Failing to take this factor into account
produces an overestimate of the race-neutral admission rate. To see
this clearly, suppose, for example, that 800 white and 200 black appli
cants (1000 total) with comparable SAT scores have respective admis
sion rates of 25% and 50% . Suppose further that white admittees ac
cept offers of admission 50% of the time, whereas black admittees
accept only 30% of the time. Under this scenario, 200 white applicants
and 100 black applicants (300 total) are admitted, and 100 white ad
mittees and 30 black admittees (130 total) accept offers of admission.
The methodology for Table A would estimate the race-neutral admis
sion rate to be 30% (300 divided by 1000), with 240 whites and 60
blacks (300 total) admitted under a race-neutral process. On the rea
sonable assumption that the black yield would move up toward the
white yield of 50% in the absence of racial preferences, however, only
260 applicants would need to be admitted in order to generate 130 ac
ceptances. Thus the yield-adjusted race-neutral admission rate is 26%
(260 divided by 1000), with 208 whites and 52 blacks (260 total) gain
ing admission.
This method of adjusting for yield produces the race-neutral ad
mission rates in Table B. The black and white yield values (lines 1 and
4) are taken from Figure 2.9 of The Shape of the River.239

238. See supra text accompanying notes 125-136.
239. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 34 fig.2.9
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APPENDIX-TABLE B

;:i

:r
N
0

SAT interval

I.

2.

3.

Black yield
Number of blacks admitted

(same as Table A, line 7)
Number of blacks matriculated (line 1 x line 2)

4.

White yield

5.

Number of whites admitted

(same as Table A, line 9)
6.

Number of whites matriculated (line 4 x line 5)

7.

Total number of matricu!ants (line 3 + line 6)

8.

Yield-adjusted number of
admittees (line 7 + line 4)

9.

Total number of applicants

(same as Table A, line 5)
10. Yield-adjusted admission
rate (line 8 + line 9)
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1000-

1050-

l lOO-

l l 50-

1 200-

1250-

1 300-

1350-
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1 149

l l99
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9
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0
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